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Neoliberal policies and evolution of crony capitalism in Morocco and Tunisia 
 
Ani Apresyan 
 
Abstract 
 
The implication of neoliberal policies directed to lessen state interventionism and increase 
the role of markets making the economies more competitive and efficient. Neoliberal 
policies applied in Morocco and Tunisia during the 1980s and 1990s aimed to transform the 
state from the economy with strong state involvement and intervention into a liberalized 
market economy where market forces are free to make economic decisions. However, the 
applied neoliberal reforms have been used to favor the elites, family groups and clans. This 
study examines whether the neoliberal policies under non-democratic regimes might 
influence the evolution of crony capitalism. Specifically, the full package of neoliberal 
policies examined and detected the plausible mechanism that used by elites to develop 
crony capitalism. To be specific, the findings show that privatization used by cronies to 
consolidate the existing cronyistic network and transfer cronyism from interpersonal and 
cultural social phenomenon structural and systematic one: crony capitalism. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
In the 1980s, fundamental liberalization processes took place and various regions have 
witnessed the widespread rise of neoliberal policies aimed to lessen the state 
interventionism in market regulations and to ensure fair competition in the market. The 
implication of neoliberal policies determined to decrease the state interventionism in the 
economy and increase the role of markets in the developing countries of MENA region 
demonstrated that instead of reducing corruption, cronyism and patronage had been used to 
favor the elites, family groups, and clans.  
The given study aims to examine whether the neoliberal policies under non-democratic 
regimes might influence the evolution of crony capitalism based on research of two 
countries.  
Since 1980s Morocco and Tunisia have been under pressure of Structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  The structural 
policies are the prescriptions to strengthen macroeconomic performance and tended to 
transform the state from the economy with strong state involvement and intervention into a 
liberalized market economy where market forces are free to make economic decisions. 
However, more than two decades of neoliberal policies served in the hands of autocratic 
regimes as tools for preferential treatment of privileged ones through various forms of state 
interventionism and supported to the domination of clans and families in Morocco and 
Tunisia. The prescriptions did not help to transfer the functions to the market moreover the 
existence of cronies’ economic interests had been defended in the system of the new market 
rearrangements. In this way, the elites supported to the structural and systematic transition 
of cronyism to crony capitalism.  
Morocco and Tunisia are chosen as cases since both had the extensive adjustment efforts, 
with an extended period of implementation, and both are perceived by IMF and the World 
Bank as the most successful reformers in the region. Studying the experience of successful 
reformers of the MEAN region is an excellent opportunity to understand how successful 
neoliberal economic reforms could endorse the possible evolution of crony capitalism. 
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The issue of cronyism has been addressed in many studies, but fewer specifically have 
focused on the influence of neoliberal policies on the development of crony capitalism. The 
attempts to focus on neoliberal reforms as an extensive policy framework of Washington 
Consensus and link it to the evolution of crony capitalism have less attention in the region. 
It is valuable to examine neoliberal policies directed to lessen state interventionism in the 
market and therefore reduce the cronyistic characteristic of the economy and see whether 
the reforms provide with the explanation of crony capitalism evolution. 
We investigate comprehensive structural changes in Morocco and Tunisia from the 1980s 
till 2011 Arab uprisings and examine whether the package of neoliberal reforms effected on 
the evolution of crony capitalism. Based on ten policies of Washington Consensus, the 
macroeconomic stabilization policies and the main structural reforms are studied relating to 
price liberalization, privatization, trade liberalization and financial sector reforms applied to 
Morocco and Tunisia. The “capture mechanism” is secluded and analyzed which might 
make possible the evolution of crony capitalism. 
Process tracing as a fundamental instrument is conducted for this research, more 
specifically we are based on the theory-building type of process tracing which is a more 
inductive form of research. Though process tracing is a single-case method, it can also be 
used in combination with other methods. For this study, we supplement theory-building 
type of process tracing with comparative research methods to identify, analyze and explain 
differences across cases while maintaining similarity on the outcome.  
We refer to the Structural adjustment programs within the Washington Consensus ten 
policies and rely on Laws, reforms, official reports, assessments, and working papers of 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. For the comparative study, we rely on legal 
guidelines regarding privatization modalities and instruments as well as on privatization 
transactions data obtained from the relevant state institutions official sources and World 
Bank Privatization Transaction Database for the double check which provides privatization 
transactions in 139 developing countries from 1988-2008 (World Bank Privatization 
Database, checked 2015). Both national sources and World Bank Privatization Database 
has limitations on privatization list regarding deal types. In this regard, we refer to relevant 
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materials from international agencies and organizations and news from leading news 
organizations offering a broad range of information on business, finance, and economy.  
The study is composed of the introduction, theoretical framework, research design and 
method, empirical analysis, and conclusion. The theoretical framework introduces an 
overview of the theory of neoliberalism and crony capitalism, the review of the relevant 
literature and the discussion of Washington Consensus. In methodology section, we 
describe research design and method applied for empirical testing, provide with data and 
the review of the literature on measurement. In the empirical part, the first section discusses 
the pre-reform period and financial crisis in both countries. In the next section, the 
neoliberal reforms with the relevant timeframe of implementation are discussed in both 
countries separately in a comparative perspective to examine the progress of reforms 
aiming to illustrate the differences between cases with a focus on their approach towards a 
market economy and regime type. The separate section is devoted to finalizing the results 
of neoliberal reforms in Morocco and Tunisia. The second part of the empirical part is 
dedicated to the analysis of crony capitalism evolution in Morocco and Tunisia with 
finalizing the results of findings in comparison. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in 
the conclusion section. 
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2.    Theoretical framework 
 
Economic liberalization has undergone an extensive rise in countries of MENA region 
stipulating the implication of neoliberal policies which are tended to transform the state 
from the economy with strong state involvement and intervention into a liberalized market 
economy where market forces are free to make economic decisions (Boone and Henry, 
2007).  
Saadatmand and McGann and Choquette (2013) state that “the main purpose of structural 
adjustment programs was to have an export-focused economy, transforming the defunct 
non-westernized economy into the free open market” (p. 152). Nevertheless, the politically 
connected elite benefited mostly, and the result was an intense concentration of economic 
wealth in the hands of the ruling elite, increased corruption and deepening inequality 
(Mossallem, 2015).  
In case of Morocco and Tunisia private investors were not on an equal level of competition 
with state-owned companies and politically connected companies and firms. Despite that 
neoliberal policies were considered as productive for economic growth, those also had a 
destructive force as created fertile ground in non-democratic countries for the concentration 
of wealth on hands of elites and their families (Johnson & Martini, 2012).  
While the literature on Arab world economic reforms and growth is rich in analyzing 
business-state relations in autocratic states, however, few studies have systematically 
examined the relationship between neoliberal policies and crony capitalism, and there is no 
direct evaluation of the neoliberal reforms’ impact on the development of crony capitalism 
in Morocco and Tunisia. 
Within the framework of this study, a comparative analysis of two countries from MENA 
region, Morocco and Tunisia, is conducted covering the period from the 1980s till 2010-
2011 Arab revolts. In the theoretical framework, we consider that the development of crony 
capitalism under non-democratic regimes might be the consequence of neoliberal policies.  
We put forward the following hypothesis: Neoliberal policies under non-democratic regime 
will likelihood develop crony capitalism.  
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The non-democratic regime in our hypothesis is not considered to be a variable but rather a 
characteristic of the chosen cases.  
According to our hypothesis, neoliberal policies likely help to develop crony capitalism to 
the contrary idea that market-oriented neoliberal policies will help to reduce corruption.  
Holcombe (2013) states that crony capitalism is a product of big government as the 
increased government involvement in economy signals that the profitability of business 
depends on government policy (p. 556). With less government, less corruption will emerge 
as a government will be deprived to have significant influence in various spheres. 
Neoliberal doctrine deeply opposed to state interventionist theories, and many studies 
dedicated to examining whether corruption can be the result of big government became one 
of the researched topics when neoliberal policies applied in developing countries.  
Neoliberal assumptions about economic efficiency and free markets adhere to the idea that 
reduced state intervention can be the practical means for deterring cronyism. According to 
Haber, the absent of limited government can cause crony capitalism (Haber, 2002, p.14). 
Khatri (2013) in his study concludes that “the greater is the political/government influence 
in economic decision making, the greater the crony capitalism (corruption) in the society” 
(p. 5).  
The neoliberal approach is to limit government involvement in the economy through the 
policies of Washington Consensus considered as the best path to ensure economic growth 
and combat corruption, particularly in developing countries. The theory of neoliberalism 
and the logic of neoliberal policies determine the necessity for the reduction of state control 
over market and establishment of a fair competitive economic environment by distributing 
equal opportunities to business actors. Nevertheless, cronies, in order not to lose the 
advantages to extract and expand their privilege opportunities, may view neoliberal policies 
as the method to protect their interests in the process of economic rearrangement. In this 
context, the examination of neoliberal policies’ implementation in our chosen countries is a 
valuable contribution to understanding whether cronyism, considered to be eliminated in 
the result of neoliberal reforms, registered the evolution to the crony capitalism. 
According to World Bank (1997) “economic policy reform should be the central pillar of an 
anti-corruption strategy in many countries” and “deregulation and the expansion of markets 
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are powerful tools for controlling corruption” (p.35). Infrastructure privatization, tax 
reforms, lowering tariffs and other barriers to international trade, public expenditure 
reduction, etc. is market tools that help to decrease corruption (World Bank, n.d.). Hence, it 
is considered that policies of Washington Consensus applied in developing countries of 
MENA region will not only lessen state intervention in the economy and ensure economic 
growth and increase market efficiency but will also deter corruption/cronyism. The 
neoliberal economic policies implemented in Morocco and Tunisia since the 1980s, on the 
contrary, supported to the development of crony capitalism.  
Several approaches will be provided to ensure the robustness of the various contributions to 
the variables, as well as Washington Consensus will be discussed which constitutes the 
baseline for the research of the policies in the chosen countries. 
 
 
2.1    Neoliberalism and neoliberal policies 
 
The term neoliberalism has widely used so far that there are too many overlapping and at 
the same time contradictory opinions. Various conceptual definitions of this complex 
phenomenon led to its ambiguity in nature, and now in literature, it is acknowledged as a 
controversial concept. We tend to discuss the origins of neoliberalism, to give some 
overview on opponents and proponents of neoliberalism and to ensure with various 
reflections of this complex phenomenon adhering to the one best accommodated to our 
research paper.  
According to Stedman Jones (2014) “the history of neoliberalism has at least three distinct 
phases, and the first phase was from the 1920s until 1950” (p. 6). The neoliberal ideas of 
monetarism, deregulation, and market-based reforms are not new (Stedman Jones, 2014). 
Stedman Jones (2014) states that "Austrian school economists and the German ordoliberals 
sought to define the contours of a market-based society, which they believed was the best 
way to organize an economy and guarantee individual liberty" (p. 6).  
However, the word “neoliberalism” is shaped by the doctrines promoted by the Mont 
Pelerin Society counting number of neoliberal intellectuals and the central node of initial 
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organization of the neoliberal thought collective, created in 1947 by Friedrich Hayek and 
Wilhelm Röpke (Denord, 2009).  
The second phase of neoliberalism lasted from the 1950s until the 1970s (Stedman Jones, 
2014, p. 7). Mirowski and Plehwe (2009) note that”the purpose of the Mont Pelerin Society 
was to create a unique space where people of like-minded political ideals could gather 
together to debate the outlines of a future movement diverging from classical liberalism” 
(p. 430).  Harvey (2005) indicates that “the members of the society depicted themselves as 
“liberals” because of their fundamental commitment to ideals of personal freedom” (p. 20). 
The neoliberal label indicated their adherence to those free-market principles of 
neoclassical economics that had emerged to displace the classical theories (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 20).  
Van Horn and Mirowski (2009) state that “neoliberalism is first and foremost a theory of 
how to re-engineer the state to guarantee the success of the market" (p.161). The neoliberal 
doctrine was extremely opposed to state interventionist theories, such as those of Keynesian 
and even more to theories of centralized state planning (Harvey, 2005 p. 20). However, 
Hayek (1944) considered that “opposition to socialist and collectivist planning should not 
be confused with a “dogmatic laissez-faire attitude” (as cited in Stedman Jones, 2014, p. 
66). Hayek (1944) emphasized that “state must have a legitimate role in the regulation of 
monetary system, the prevention of private monopolies and the supervision of natural 
monopolies” and an “essential to guarantee the conditions of free competition” (as cited in 
Stedman Jones, 2014, pp. 66-67). This statement distinguishes him from Milton Friedman 
who with other Chicago neoliberals, after 1950, redefined the classical doctrine concerning 
monopoly and corporations (Van Horn, 2009, p. 206). 
Keynesianism as the dominant theoretical framework in economics and economic policy-
making could not be able to solve the crisis of unemployment and inflation rise in the 
1970s thus putting an end to the state’s traditional interventionist policies (Denord, 2009). 
In Keynesianism also known as demand-side economics, the demand is the driving force of 
the economy, in other words, the government is responsible for increasing the demand to 
ensure the growth thus making the accent on state intervention in the market (Babb, 2013). 
The neoliberal supply-side economics as a new neoclassical orthodoxy based on favoring 
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business to expand by tax cuts and deregulation (Babb, 2013). Therefore, supply-side 
economics aim to work free market more efficiently in the less-state system, in other words, 
it reduces government protectionism and interference.  
The expansion of the Mont Pelerin Society infrastructure accelerated in the 1970s and 
spread to most corners of the world pushing for a new economic project founded on 
neoliberal assumptions about economic efficiency, reduced state intervention and free 
markets (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Since then neoliberalism was introduced as new 
orthodoxy with the goal to weaken the welfare state and central planning aimed to 
introduce less severe state control on the economy by privatization, deregulation, and 
financial and trade liberalization counted as the key “MPS doctrines”(Mirowski & Plehwe, 
2009).  
The Chicago School as a complement to the Mont Pèlerin Society was established after the 
war committed to “the reconciliation of the neoliberal ideas with a rather simplistic form of 
neoclassical economics” (Mirowski, 2018, para. 12). “Chicago boys” became as a direct 
result of Chicago school of neoliberalism. The group of technocrats trained in neoliberal 
theories of Milton Friedman at the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago 
and boosted monetarist view through criticizing Keynesian approach in Chile and trying to 
reconstruct Chilean economy. In particular, Hayek and Friedman's main objective was the 
reduction of state intervention in the economy (Dunn, 2017, p.439).  
Friedman (1951) as one of the greatest neoliberal theorist, in his paper Neo-liberalism and 
Its Prospects, argued that “laissez-faire must be the rule…. it lacked the necessary 
ingredients for the success of free markets. It must give high place to a severe limitation on 
the power of the state to interfere in the detailed activities of individuals; at the same time, 
it must explicitly recognize that there are important positive functions that must be 
performed by the state… it would have the function of providing a framework within which 
free competition could flourish, and the price system operates effectively” (p.3). 
After the first experiment of neoliberal policies in Chile, neoliberalism as a new economic 
orthodoxy had been expanded in the capitalist world in 1979, mainly in the United States 
and Great Britain as a leading paradigm (Harvey, 2005). It was an answer to chronic state 
stagflation consisted of inflation, unemployment, and a stagnate economy (Harvey, 2005). 
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The third phase of neoliberalism started in the 1980s when market liberalization and fiscal 
discipline advanced into development and trade policy (Stedman Jones, 2014, para. 17). 
The global crisis of the 1970s and rising influence of the Washington-based international 
financial institutions, mainly the IMF and the World Bank, promoted their roles as agents 
of neoliberalism by setting broad policy guidelines for a sever neoliberal development 
model over the economies of the countries. Adopted by economists and policymakers of the 
IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), neoliberal policies later were 
notably enlarged with institutional reforms. Harvey (2005) states that since the 1980s “IMF 
and the World Bank became centers for the propagation and enforcement of ‘free market 
fundamentalism’ and neoliberal orthodoxy” (p. 29).  
Due to the complexity of the term with numerous versions of explanations which in recent 
years used to describe any tendency in various disciplines with different meanings 
complicates our task to define what kind of phenomenon is neoliberalism. Therefore, the 
more prominent ones of this overloaded term will be discussed ensuring with various 
patterns of criticism of neoliberalism encountered in the literature and the relevant one will 
be accommodated to the study. 
In his work Against Neoliberalism as a Concept, Dunn discusses Brenner and Theodore’s 
view on neoliberalism. Brenner and Theodore (2002) argue that “probably the most 
influential accounts see neoliberalism as an ideology, championing ‘open competitive, and 
unregulated markets’” (as cited in Dunn, 2017, p. 438). Mirowski (2009) considers that 
neoliberalism was “an intricately structured long-term philosophical and political project,” 
or in our terminology, a “thought collective” (p. 426). But when this “thought collective” 
became influential it is then interpreted as a ‘project for radical system transformation’ and 
as Jessop (2002) and Gamble (2001) mention “neo-liberalism jumped the barrier into 
practical politics’ (as cited in Dunn, 2017, p.439). 
In the recent literature about neoliberalism, David Harvey (2005) gave one of the wide-
ranging definitions of neoliberalism concept in his A Brief History of Neoliberalism.   
 
Harvey (2005) states, “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political, 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
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liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and 
integrity of money"(p. 2).  
Harvey (2005) continues "state interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to 
a bare minimum because it cannot possibly possess enough information to second-
guess market signals (prices) which powerful interest groups will inevitably distort 
supporting bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their benefit” (p. 
2). 
 
Hence, Harvey emphasized that neoliberalism is a theory of political, economic practices 
rather than a purely political ideology (Harvey 2005). In the same book, he criticizes 
neoliberalism as a form of the political economy associated to some degree with the 
restoration or reconstruction of the power of economic elites (Harvey, 2005). Harvey 
(2005) states that “neoliberalization is either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical 
design for the reorganization of international capitalism or a political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites" (p. 19). 
He continues, "In what follows I shall argue that the second of these objectives has in 
practice dominated" (Harvey, 2005, p. 19).  
Arguing about capital accumulation and economic power, Harvey (2005) emphasizes that 
"neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, 
but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and 
China) creating, the power of an economic elite" (p. 19). 
A Nobel Prize-winning economist and ex-vice-president of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz 
turned into critique neoliberalism in his last interview Criticism of Neoliberalism to Trend 
Online Zeitung, on February 2004.  Stiglitz (2004) criticizes that "neoliberalism doesn't 
produce growth and creates social inequality" (para. 1). He (2004) continues, "markets left 
to themselves, particularly in developing countries, are inefficient"  (para. 1).  "What is sold 
nowadays as economics is, in reality, an ideology or a religion" (Stiglitz, 2004, para. 1).  
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Economists Duménil and Lévy (2016) in their latest work The Crisis of Neoliberalism 
argue that the primary objectives of neoliberalism were to restore the power of upper 
classes and to increase their profits and capital (para. 2).  
This criticism towards neoliberalism is the direct response to the failure of neoliberal 
policies in developing countries. Moreover, what is turned to emerge as a useful tool to 
reduce state control on the economy and to ensure economic efficiency, on the contrary, 
supported the concentration and consolidation of capital in the hands of elites in developing 
countries and promoted the increase of poverty, inequality, and corruption.  
According to Larner (2006), neoliberalism was a “shift from Keynesian welfarism towards 
the new approach of governments to focus on enhancing economic efficiency and 
international competitiveness and as a consequence, the "rolling back" of welfare state 
activities with a new emphasis on market provisioning of formerly "public" goods and 
services” (p. 6, 7). Craig and Porter (2006), Ward and England (2007), Boas and Gans-
Morse (2009) state that as an economic doctrine, neoliberalism was “a package of 
economic reform policies including, inter alia, liberalization, privatization, deregulation and 
public spending cuts, and carried out in developed and developing countries alike”(as cited 
in Kreitmeyr-Koska, 2016, p. 11). However, the attempts to define neoliberalism as merely 
the process leading to the “hollowing out” of state will be too simple for such a complex 
phenomenon.  
On the contrary, literature about neoliberalism is not limited to the theories of political and 
economic practices, and a lot of authors consider that neoliberalism is the hegemonic 
political-economic project as well. Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that neoliberalism can be 
characterized as a movement from “proto-” to “roll-back” neoliberalism: a move from the 
philosophical project of the early 1970s to the era of neoliberal conviction politics during 
the 1980s (p. 388).  
Ward and England (2007) note that neoliberalism is not considered a political and 
economic doctrine solely, but it is also a hegemonic ideological project; neoliberalism as 
governmentality; neoliberalism as policy and program; neoliberalism as state form (as cited 
in Giannone, 2016, p.496).  
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Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) continue elaborating the notion of neoliberalism and specify 
it as “a political project allied to specific state-led strategies incorporating neoliberal ideas 
and promoted through the different processes characterized by privatization, liberalization, 
marketization, deregulation, and monetarism” (p.6). Larner (2000) indicates that 
neoliberalism in critical social science literature appears to refer to specific political 
projects such as Thatcherism and Regeanomics (p.5). 
In turn, Kreitmeyr-Koska (2016) defines neoliberalism as “not merely an economic, a 
development or a socio-political project that promotes market rationalities in all spheres of 
social life but it encompasses all these different facets at the same time and interlinks 
economic, development and socio-political issues, spheres and actors in a given spatial and 
temporal context”(p. 10).  
We go further and elaborate on the notion what neoliberal policies are. As Babb and 
Kentikelenis (2018) define, by ‘neoliberal policy’ they mean “any measure intended to 
lessen the role of states and enhance the role of markets in at least one national economy” 
(p.16). Bunce provides a more detailed explanation of neoliberal reforms. According to 
Bunce (2001), “neoliberal reforms refer to all policies that promote marketization, 
privatization, and free trade”, which usually include macroeconomic stabilization, 
microeconomic liberalization, and institutional reforms” (p. 46).  
For this research, we will address neoliberalism as policy. Neoliberalism as a policy aimed 
to lessen state interventionism in market regulations to ensure fair competition in the 
market but also we rely on the definition of Venugopal (2015) that extends the notion of the 
withdrawal of the state from the market: "economic agenda that promotes not just the 
withdrawal of the state from market regulation, but the establishment of market-friendly 
mechanisms and incentives to organize a wide range of economic, social and political 
activity" (p.171). So the neoliberal policy is a mechanism in the hands of the state to 
abstain from using a political control to intervene in the market and create the strict 
regulations that will promote economic activities. 
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2.2    Washington Consensus 
 
During the late 1980s, the extension of neoliberalism to the Global South through the 
Washington Consensus promoted reforms in Southern countries (Williamson, 2000). The 
term "Washington Consensus" has been invented and coined in 1989 by John Williamson, 
an English economist (Williamson, 2000). Washington Consensus was not written as a 
policy prescription for development but rather a set of policy reforms that Williamson 
claimed most of official Washington would agree to be needed to be good for Latin 
American countries (Williamson, 2000). Stedman Jones (2014) mentions that “in 1971 the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system indicated that fixed exchange 
rates practicing is over ” (para. 3). The aftermath of the Bretton Woods the promotion of a 
set of policies is addressed to Latin American countries as of 1989 by Washington based 
institutions such as IMF and World Bank.  
According to Williamson (2004), ten reforms that constituted Washington Consensus list 
are as follows: "1. Budget deficit; 2. Public expenditure; 3. Tax reform; 4. Interest rate; 5. A 
unified exchange rate; 6. Trade liberalization; 7. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows; 
8. Privatization; 9.Deregulation; 10. Provision of secure property rights" (p. 3). By 
proposing to reduce regulations, Williamson's argument was the opportunity to minimize 
the potential for corruption, primarily in Latin America. 
Criticism around Washington Consensus was not limited only to the theoretical and 
ideological opposition, but there are also problems that have been associated with its 
application in developing countries. The privatization is considered to be as one of the most 
important policies not only in developed but particularly in developing countries. 
Regarding developing countries, the privatization is necessary to achieve the economic 
development in a long-term perspective by solving the problem of inefficient state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Kim, 2005). The second essential factor is the fiscal deficit and the 
increasing foreign debt burden that force developing countries to support the privatization 
(Kim, 2005). However, as mentioned, the application of neoliberal policies and their effects 
can be diverse in developed and developing countries, and the privatization can have 
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various impacts because of different levels of the institutional and regulatory framework of 
the current state.  
Kim emphasizes that privatization programs typically have several objectives and one of 
them is to promote the development of capital market and to improve financial performance 
(Kim, 2005, p.888). At the same time, it also has the political objective. It is necessary to 
include a significant segment of the middle-income class into the privatization process, thus 
supporting large segments of society to enlarge property ownership (Kim, 2005, p.888). 
The author mentions that to realize the real objective of privatization, it is also essential to 
maintain the economic stability and transparency of privatization process, the factors which 
developing countries lack (Kim, 2005). 
The criticism towards privatization in developing countries is the belief that the process of 
privatization has been unfair, hurting the marginalized workers, and benefiting the 
privileged and powerful, providing opportunities to enrich the corrupt and negatively 
affects distribution of wealth, income, and political power (Birdsall & Nellis, 2005). 
According to Kim (2005), “the concentration of economic powers and polarization of 
capital do not enhance competition. In markets, in reality, privatization abolishes state 
monopoly and secures private monopoly.”(p.891). It is a contra argument to the supporters 
of the privatization that it promotes competition. Hence, the process of privatization as one 
of the essential pillars of neoliberal policies should encompass the mentioned concerns. 
Though it is directed to address the issue of competition and enhance the efficiency of the 
market and moreover, the developing countries may gain from privatization covering fiscal 
deficit, but the problem of transparency of the process can be a challenge to register it as a 
success. The success of privatization should be assessed against the objectives the 
governments seek to complete. As these objectives may vary from country to country, the 
success can also be linked to the regulatory framework which depends on the political and 
institutional setting of the current state as well. 
So, in the context of developing countries, the application of Washington Consensus 
policies might register quite the opposite picture. As Mavroudeas and Papadatos mention 
there is a widespread perception that it failed, led to crises and impoverishment and 
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increased the gap between developed and developing countries (Mavroudeas & Papadatos, 
2007, p.47). 
Washington Consensus and its ideological and political background are undeniable being 
not only a simple policy proposal but constituting a backbone of IFIs to transmit the policy 
norms around the world. 
Washington Consensus has its defenders and supporters, but much critique has been 
written, not mentioning that it was used at least for two distinct interpretations significantly 
different to what Williamson assures he has intended. Williamson emphasizes that the 
coined term and its original usage served to numerous interpretations varied from the 
original one (Williamson, 2004). The policies have been much criticized by economists 
such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman (Stedman Jones, 2014). Stiglitz (2002, 2008) 
argued that “Washington Consensus was presented as a ‘market fundamentalism’, kind of a 
dogmatic and literal interpretation of the principles of classical and neoclassical 
economics” and the concept of development has too narrow perspective summarized as 
liberalization, stabilization, and privatization (as cited in Babb, 2013, p. 270). 
Williamson’s response to the criticism is that the original meaning of Washington 
Consensus is ten specific policy reforms combining a set of macroeconomic policies 
intended to restore economic stability and principally focuses on policy reforms that reduce 
the role of government (Williamson, 2000). Williamson (2004) was concerned that 
Washington Consensus is considered as a synonym for what is often called "neoliberalism" 
or market fundamentalism which is “a thoroughly objectionable perversion of the original 
meaning” (p. 201). He emphasizes that only privatization as one of the Washington 
Consensus policies has distinctively neoliberal origins (Williamson 2004).  
 
Williamson (2002) mentions, “I of course never intended my term to imply policies like 
capital account liberalization, monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal state 
(getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution), which I think of as 
the quintessentially neoliberal ideas. If that is how the term is interpreted, then we can all 
enjoy its wake, although let us at least have the decency to recognize that these ideas have 
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rarely dominated thought in Washington and certainly never commanded a consensus there 
or anywhere much else except perhaps at meetings of the Mont Pelerin Society”(para. 5).  
 
Mirowski (2009) in his work “The Road from Mont Pelerin” claims that critics outside of 
the economics profession had taken to equating Williamson’s list with a roster of policies 
characteristic of neoliberalism (p.8). Williamson (2004) states “I use the word 
‘neoliberalism’ in its original sense, to refer to the doctrines espoused by the Mont Pèlerin 
Society” (p. 2). The part of criticism was that the policies were considered as universalistic 
without taking into account the national peculiarities. Notably, in Stiglitz (1998b) view: 
“ideological debates should be over; there should be agreement that while markets are at 
the center of the economy, governments must play an important role. The issue is one of 
balance, and that balance may depend on the country, the capacity of its government, the 
institutional development of its markets”, so in other words, development advice should be 
adapted to the circumstances of the country” (as cited in Snowdon, 2001, p.48). 
Stiglitz criticism is based on the recent tendencies of neoliberalism decline when the core 
essence of neoliberalism to rely entirely on the free market economy, excluding state 
intervention gives the opposite effect (Stiglitz, 2004). According to Stiglitz (2004) “markets 
left to themselves, particularly in developing countries, are inefficient. The state must 
intervene with these “incomplete” markets” (para. 17). He considers that "the liberalization 
of capital markets exposes developing countries to an enormous risk" (Stiglitz, 2004, para. 
18). 
Williamson argued in his later articles that the various interpretation of Washington 
Consensus as a policy manifesto made to believe that it can be valid for all places and at all 
times (Williamson, 2000). 
Another concern raised by Williamson is that IMF and World Bank use a set of economic 
policies in a most conservative interpretation stipulating the transformation of a set of broad 
policy guidelines to a sever neoliberal development model advocated for developing 
countries by official Washington and later enlarged by the international financial 
institutions with a heavy emphasis on institutional reforms and with strong impose on client 
countries (Williamson, 2004, p.2).  
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Other supporters of Washington Consensus consider that both the neo-liberal character and 
the policy prescriptions are correct and the failures of the Washington Consensus in 
developing countries were the result of incorrect implementation and unwillingness of 
reformers (Mavroudeas & Papadatos, 2007).  
Whatsoever interpretations and opponents or proponents of Washington Consensus 
emerged, we tended to present the original version of ten policies of Washington Consensus 
and its neoliberal origins. The purpose is to have a vision about original set of policies as 
they constitute the basis for examining the implemented reforms in this research. The 
institutionalization of neoliberalism by IFIs and the promotion of Washington Consensus 
agenda with a focus on the importance of SAPs is a backbone for our study of reforms in 
the chosen case countries. It was necessary to understand what is considered to be 
neoliberalism and what kind of interpretations of the term influenced on its usage 
particularly in Washington Consensus framework.  
Primarily developed for Latin America countries Washington Consensus was not only used 
as a set of policy proposals in developing countries, but it was also augmented with 
institutional reforms by the World Bank and the IMF to impose on client countries as a 
condition for receiving any international assistance. It was described as a development 
prescription by transforming its ideological and political background to severe neoliberal 
model for development. The imposed aggressive neoliberal policies proved to have an 
adverse effect in many developing countries. 
 
2.3    Crony Capitalism 
 
Neoliberal doctrine deeply opposed to state interventionist theories. Examination of 
corruption in developing countries as the result of big government became one of the 
researched topics. Cronyism is a broad and vague concept and has rarely been used in the 
academic literature and is still poorly understood. The term has been affirmed regarding 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 when Krugman tried to describe a particular economic 
system considered to be specific to Far Eastern countries (Krugman, 1998). Krugman 
primarily criticizes the East Asian economic model based on a close linkage between 
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government and big businesses (Krugman, 1998). So, the term is both economic and 
political phenomenon.  
Holcombe considers that crony capitalism is possible in all market economies because it is 
not realistic to detach economic power from the influence of political decisions (Holcombe 
2013, p.555). Hence, the phenomenon of cronyism may resonate in developed and 
democratic countries as well.   
It is also demanding to understand whether the term cronyism has the same meaning as the 
concepts of corruption and rent-seeking. These terms defined in various ways taking into 
account their multifaceted nature, and are relatively full functional and widely used in 
scholarly literature. Scholars raise the question whether it is practical to label a new term as 
it will be an attempt to duplicate already functional terms. Our effort will be, first of all, to 
provide with various examples of definitions of cronyism to draw a line between cronyism 
and corruption and second, to ensure with the conceptualization of crony capitalism for our 
research. 
Khatri and Tsang and Begley consider that due to the problem of ambiguity, there is a 
necessity to distinguish cronyism from corruption as it has been used as an all-
encompassing classification (Khatri, Tsang & Begley, 2006, p. 62). There are various 
versions of definitions of corruption, and not only scholars try to define it but also 
organizations. The most popular definition of corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain” (Transparency International, n.d.).  
Khatri et al. (2006) treat cronyism as “a subset of corruption found in social networks 
characterized by complex, indirect, and mutually reinforcing social exchanges” (p. 63). 
Similarly, Aligica and Tarko point out that there are distinctions between cronyism and 
“corrupted” behavior, emphasizing that the latter is based on family ties or close 
connections, often over an extended period, whereas corruption involves more direct 
payment (bribery) for specific services (Aligica & Tarko, 2014, p. 159). They state “the 
most significant and consequential form of cronyism usually involves relationships 
between members of high echelons of society or between large firms or political class” 
(Aligica & Tarko, 2014, p. 33). 
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Examining crony capitalism in Asian countries, Krueger (2002) chooses the following 
definition of cronyism “those close to the political authorities receive favors that have large 
economic value. Usually, these favors are not outright transfers of wealth such as forgiving 
taxes or providing subsidies but rather take place through the provision of economic 
entitlements” (p. 2).  
As such, Smith and Sutter in their attempt to define the cronyism through the lens of 
differences between corruption and rent-seeking and cronyism pointing out that various 
forms of cronyism are generally legal (Smith & Shutter, 2012). As an example, Smith & 
Shutter (2012) elaborate on lobbying, “cronyism refers to unequal competition, where those 
with the closest connections to the political process gain an advantage over their 
competitors in the pursuit for consumers’ dollars” (p.8).  
Soreide (2006) considers that cronyism is when “political networks dominate important 
private assets, or ‘state capture’ in which private firms can influence public power to their 
benefit” (as cited in Smith & Shutter, 2012, p. 8). 
Now having a particular picture what cronyism is and how to differentiate it from 
corruption it is necessary to define crony capitalism. 
According to Salter (2014) “crony capitalism is a form of corruption wherein private parties 
make the undue profit from abuse of public authority benefiting from the public purse by 
their group membership and relationships with public office holders, rather than their 
“individual and universal citizenship”(p.8).  
It is already mentioned that the term cronyism has been used to describe also a system and 
particularly political-economic systems in developing countries, and Aligica and Tarko 
consider that in this context we can talk about truly “crony capitalism” (Aligica & Tarko, 
2014, p. 159). Haber (2002) mentions that “crony capitalism is usually thought of a system 
in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies receive 
favors that have a large economic value” (p. 12).  He notes “crony capitalism is not solely 
an economic phenomenon. It is a political creation and has political consequences” (2002, 
p. 18).  
Similarly, Khatri (2013) thinks that “a politicized or rigged economic system is dubbed as 
crony capitalism” (p.5). Holcombe characterizes crony capitalism as insiders with political 
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connections in a system who can get benefits if their business depend on political 
connections (Holcombe, 2013, p.556). In a similar way Wei (2001) defines crony 
capitalism as an economic system where the profitability of business depends on political 
connections and “the adjudication of commercial disputes and the allocation of resources" 
generally made to favor those who have a close relationship with political leaders or 
government officials (by blood or by bribes) (p.16). 
Though crony capitalism is a relatively new term, the attempts to define and analyze it are 
extensive. Moreover, the efforts to put forward a precise definition of the term crony 
capitalism are not limited to individual scholars. In recent years it is also the prerogative of 
IFIs such as World Bank to frame the term cronyism and crony capitalism. As such, the 
World Bank’s definition of cronyism and crony capitalism relates to economic and business 
sphere. “Cronyism is partiality to long-standing friends, especially by appointing them to 
positions of authority, regardless of their qualifications, or granting privileged access to 
economic opportunities and/or preferential treatment in dealing with administrative 
procedures” (World Bank, 2014, p. 111) according to World Bank. World Bank (2014) 
defines that in the economic sphere, "crony capitalism is a term describing an economy in 
which success in business depends on close relationships between business people and 
government officials(p. 111).  
"It may be exhibited by favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants, 
special tax breaks, or other forms of state interventionism” (World Bank, 2014, p. 111) 
It is specifically important to incorporate the definitions for this research, taking into 
account the varieties of the definition of cronyism and crony capitalism. First, we rely on 
the concept of cronyism defined by Aligica and Tarko (2014) “Crony exchanges based on 
trust, loyalty, family, and long-standing social networks,” “the most significant and 
consequential form of cronyism usually involves relationships between members of high 
echelons of society or between large firms or political class” (p.159). The choice of this 
definition relies on the study purpose to understand the relations between family, clan, and 
elites in case countries as it influences not only the development of interpersonal and 
cultural phenomenon of cronyism but as Aligica and Tarko mention effects on the 
transition from an approach to cronyism as interpersonal and cultural social phenomenon to 
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cronyism as a structural and systematic feature: crony capitalism (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). 
Second, the World Bank’s (2014) definition of crony capitalism stating “an economy in 
which success in business depends on close relationships between business people and 
government officials and  may be exhibited by favoritism in the distribution of legal 
permits, government grants, special tax breaks, or other forms of state interventionism” (p. 
111). We decided to incorporate two definitions as it provides with explanations on how 
various forms of state interventionism for granting economic opportunities ensure the 
robustness of crony capitalism development in case countries. 
Though crony capitalism is rarely new phenomenon, there are several studies focused on 
the causes of crony capitalism development. Exploring the phenomenon of crony capitalism 
in Croatia, Ivanković considers that crony capitalism as a phenomenon emerged under 
conditions of political instability and the transition and privatization stimulated the 
development of crony capitalism in Croatia (Ivanković, 2017, p.40). The model examines 
whether there were features of crony capitalism as a consequence of privatization and the 
transition from socialism and concludes that the collapse of Agrokor, the largest Croatian 
conglomerate, illustrates the development of crony capitalism in Croatia and its relation to 
the privatization process (Ivanković, 2017, p.40). Similarly, examining crony capitalism in 
Bulgaria, Peev emphasizes that the emerging system, based on the policy of ownership and 
control transformation in Bulgaria, can be described as 'crony' capitalism (Peev, 2002, p. 
73). 
The political literature is quite rich in studies of Arab cronyism and some works 
specifically address the issue of business-state relations created by liberalization processes 
both in Morocco and Tunisia. Several studies represent a rich analyze how global markets 
helped local business groups to mobilize. In this context, Cammett’s study is noteworthy 
based on documentary research and interviews with over 200 Moroccan and Tunisian 
businesspeople and other professionals on how neoliberal reforms may or may not 
engender collective political capacities of business communities (Cammett, 2007). Some 
scholars focus their attention on studying specifically crony capitalism in Morocco. In this 
regard it is worthy to mention Saadi’s research on cronyistic business-government relations 
in Morocco and whether these relations positively or negatively influence on competition 
 28 
 
and economic growth (Saadi, 2016, p.2). Economic research on this topic was scarce due to 
the problem of access to firm ownership data. Hence the quantitative method of 
measurement and Saadi’s quantitative approach was an attempt to find out whether or not 
Moroccan cronyism has contributed or hampered economic growth. 
Kreitmeyr-Koska examined how neoliberalism and neoliberal approaches contributed to the 
authoritarian renewal in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco (Kreitmeyr-Koska, 2016). Oubenal 
focused on crony capitalism examining Moroccan companies and the role of the financial 
sector by applying a network analysis of board members of the Moroccan listed companies 
confirming and proved the centrality of finance compared to other sectors (Oubenal, 2016, 
p. 2). Diwan and Chekir conducted another research on crony capitalism in Egypt to 
understand the reasons of constraints to economic growth in Egypt. They compared 
corporate performance and stock market valuation of politically connected and unconnected 
firms, before and after the 2011 uprisings and came to the conclusion that granted 
privileges allowed connected firms to increase their market size and power (Diwan & 
Chekir 2012, p. 1). Regarding studies focused on Tunisia, Freund and Nucifora and Rijkers' 
research identified the relationship between the business interests of ex-President Ben Ali 
and his family examining the behavior of 220 Tunisian firms benefited from FDI 
restrictions (Freund, Nucifora & Rijkers, 2014). Bergh conducted the study of the effects of 
neoliberal reforms on local governance and showed that such reforms are often 
subordinated to established patterns of political contestation among actors (Bergh, 2012, p. 
303). Gerring and Thacker tested the relationship between neoliberal economic policies and 
political corruption, by applying a large cross-national data set from the mid-to-late 1990s 
and found that open trade and investment policies and low, effective regulatory burdens do 
correlate with lower levels of political corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2005, p. 233). 
However, no consistent relationship was detected between the aggregate size of the public 
sector and political corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2005, p. 233). Holcombe developed a 
hypothesis linking crony capitalism with big government involvement in the economy and 
suggested retaining small government as the most effective means of controlling crony 
capitalism” (Holcombe, 2013, p. 557).  
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The issue of cronyism has been addressed in many studies, but fewer specifically have 
focused on the influence of neoliberal policies on the development of crony capitalism. The 
process of trade liberalization and its relation to political corruption and business-state 
relations do have attention. Nevertheless, the attempts to focus on neoliberal reforms as an 
extensive policy framework of Washington Consensus and link it to the evolution of crony 
capitalism have less attention in the region. It is valuable to examine neoliberal policies 
directed to lessen state interventionism in the market and therefore reduce the cronyistic 
characteristic of the economy and see whether the reforms provide with the explanation of 
crony capitalism evolution. 
The existing studies aim to examine the relations of crony capitalism with only one or two 
neoliberal reforms such as trade and FDI liberalization. We want to extend the possibility to 
explore the whole package of macroeconomic stabilization policies and the main structural 
reforms through investigation of two different ('shock therapy' approach and the 
'gradualist') approaches towards a market economy applied in Morocco and Tunisia. In this 
study, the starting point is the varying political and economic background conditions of the 
countries which registered worsening situation of crony capitalism. Moreover, the 
examination of market economy approaches helps us to understand whether there are 
divergent results in main macroeconomic indicators and structural reforms in both 
countries. 
We examine the issue of crony capitalism linking it with neoliberal policies through the 
process of privatization and show that the neoliberal policies served in the hands of 
autocratic regimes as tools for preferential treatment of privileged ones. We address 
neoliberal arguments and develop a framework to show the causal path between two 
phenomena. 
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1. Methodology 
 
Morocco and Tunisia are chosen as cases since both had the extensive adjustment 
efforts, with an extended period of implementation, and both are perceived by IMF and the 
World Bank as the most successful reformers in the region. Studying the experience of 
successful reformers of the MEAN region is an excellent opportunity to understand how 
successful neoliberal economic reforms could endorse the possible evolution of crony 
capitalism. 
The focus is on the 1980-2011 period because first, the 1980s were associated with an 
economic collapse in the early 1980s when the conditions in the world market changed 
causing a severe economic crisis in Morocco and Tunisia. Second, the period of the 
financial and external debt crisis followed by a period of economic reforms initiated by 
World Bank and continued till the events of 2010-2011 in Arab uprisings against the 
regimes. The Arab revolts led to Tunisian Revolution ending up with 30-years presidency 
of Ben Ali in Tunisia, whereas the Monarchy in Morocco could keep its dominant political 
positions despite promises to undertake comprehensive constitutional reforms.  
Though the autocratic regime of both countries is not a variable for the current research, 
this characteristic might be an essential supplemental element in the understanding of the 
overall picture of political culture and approaches to the reform implementation in these 
countries. 
 
1.1 Measurement and Data 
 
There are several ways for the measurement of neoliberal policies. Friedman focused on 
systematically analyzing the reforms and policies that had transformed the socialist, 
economically backward nations to market-driven capitalist economies (Friedman, 2010, p. 
4). Saadatmand et al. employed a polynomial panel-data regression from 1997-2010 and 
used Freedom Index Scores for the measure of neo-liberal economic policies while 
investigating the impact of the economic changes on female primary education rates in 
Africa (Saadatmand et al., 2013, p.150). Gerring and Thacker applied two measures of 
trade openness, one measure of inflation, and one measure of the regulatory environment 
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while focusing on three areas of the neoliberal economic policy agenda: trade, inflation, 
and regulation (Gerring and Thacker, 2005, p. 233). The study conducted by Bergh directed 
to reveal the effects of neoliberal economic reforms on local governance in Mediterranean 
region through exploring the reforms on decentralization, public-private partnerships, 
outsourcing in the area of public service delivery, labor market reforms, public 
accountability and state-society relations (Bergh, 2012). 
Various measurement approaches are developed from the concept of crony capitalism. In 
his study, Oubenal used a methodology of a social network analysis of board co-
membership among listed companies of the financial sector based on quantitative measures 
showing that clans and families in power use the neoliberal reforms to gain economic 
resources and confirmed that the centrality of finance compared to other sectors exists in 
Morocco. Peev used survey’s information collected from the Bulgarian Central Statistical 
office (1990-2001) and his empirical studies of firms and industries in Bulgaria and proved 
that that dual enterprise sector is the most important aspect of the emerging 'crony' 
capitalism in Bulgaria during 1992-99 (Peev, 2002). Diwan and Chekir in an attempt to 
understand crony capitalism in Egypt compared politically connected and unconnected 
firms' corporate performance and the stock market valuation before and after the 2011 
uprising, and showed that the mechanisms used to grant advantages and privileges allowed 
connected firms to increase their market size, power and their borrowings (Diwan & 
Chekir, 2014, p.1). Saadi examined Moroccan cronyism by applying a quantitative 
approach to explore the relationships between capture mechanisms and the performances of 
politically connected firms using the database of public administration in charge of surveys 
of manufactures, which comprises 8,372 manufacturing firms with around 83,725 
observations (Saadi, 2016, p. 7). As well as, he used firm-level data, contains equity 
amount, turnover, production, number of permanent employees, investment, gross income 
(i.e., before taxes, interest, and depreciation), net income, and added value (Saadi, 2016). 
By combining these two databases, he identified that political connectedness is a part of an 
extensive patronage network and Moroccan cronyism has contributed to unleashing 
economic growth (Saadi, 2016). One of the latest studies examining the relationship 
between the business interests of the Tunisian ex-President Ben Ali and his family 
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conducted by Freund et al. (Freund et al., 2014, p. 2). The authors identified 220 firms 
owned by the Ben Ali family that were confiscated in the aftermath of the Jasmin 
revolution (Freund et al., 2014). They merged the data with administrative data from the tax 
authorities, containing balance sheet information, and create a database of the evolution of 
the Tunisian investment law from 1993 until 2010 (Freund et al., 2014).  
We aim to examine the evolution of crony capitalism as a consequence of neoliberal 
economic reforms and process tracing as a fundamental instrument of the qualitative 
method is conducted for this research. According to Beach (2017), “process-tracing 
research probes the theoretical causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes together” 
and mechanisms are not causes but are causal processes that are triggered by causes and 
that link them with outcomes in a productive relationship (p.3). The process tracing 
importance is not only to trace on what happened but also on how it happened. Moreover, 
process tracing allows the researcher to develop an analytical explanation of a causal path 
that leads to a specific outcome. Many plausible mechanisms can be included in the relation 
between the variables and to identify which one works, the choice of process tracing is 
priceless. It will allow identifying the mechanism between neoliberal reforms and the 
probability of crony capitalism development. 
We are based on the theory-building type of process tracing which is a more inductive form 
of research and it starts with the structured analysis of empirical material and uses it to 
detect a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is linked to Y (Beach, 2017). 
Though process tracing is a single-case method, it can also be used in combination with 
other methods. Particularly for small-N studies, it is possible to combine Millian methods 
with process tracing. For this study, it is necessary to supplement theory-building type of 
process tracing with comparative research methods to identify, analyze and explain 
differences across cases while maintaining similarity on the outcome.  
The purpose is to underline and make an argument that despite the varying political, 
economic backgrounds and pre-conditions, structures and models of transition, the 
comprehensive neoliberal reforms caused the similar worsening situation of crony 
capitalism in both countries.  
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We take into account the political, economic and institutional structures of both countries 
with varying and specific characteristics of histories of political economy, existing 
economic resources and political and institutional infrastructure. Both are interesting in 
regard to neoliberal policies with variations with approaches towards a market economy: 
the 'shock therapy' and the 'gradualist' approaches which we take into account to underline 
the preferred approaches for market liberalization. In this regard, Tunisia adhered to 
gradualist model with more evolutionary process towards a market system, whereas 
Morocco applied shock therapy approach with rapid implementation of reforms. Apart from 
the economic approaches, both countries differ from each other with their political and 
economic structure and resources.  
Returning to the theory-building type of process tracing, we examine the roots of cronyism 
and trace the sectors of the economy under the control of cronies during the pre-reform 
period to identify the potential sectors of the economy that cronies and business groups will 
try to maintain the control and expand their network.  
We start with our empirical material such as tracing the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms and cronyism to detect the plausible causal processes connecting these two 
variables. Thus we use the evidence as hints to indicate the causal mechanisms that link the 
variables with the outcome. We detect the probable mechanism, which is the process of 
privatization, linking our variables. Thus, privatization is identified as a mechanism which 
leads to crony capitalism in the context of neoliberal policies.  
For neoliberal reforms examination, we refer to the SAPs in Morocco and Tunisia to track 
the improvements applied. We rely on Laws, reforms, official reports, assessments, and 
working papers of World Bank and IMF. Based on ten policies of Washington Consensus, 
we examine and trace macroeconomic stabilization policies and the main structural reforms 
concerning price liberalization, privatization, trade liberalization and financial sector 
reforms. We stick to World Bank and IMF as these institutions are the promoters and 
supporters of political economic reforms in the chosen countries and have an enormous 
amount of documentation and reports on the implemented SAPs, as well as the required 
data is transparent and open. The examination of reforms will show whether the state 
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protectionism reduced, what kind of reforms implemented and whether the reforms 
supported to the liberalization of the various sectors of the economy. 
We mainly detect that privatization, as one of the essential neoliberal policies, which is 
under the criticism of being unfair regarding competition, transparency and the used 
modalities in the chosen countries. For the implementation of privatization, the defined 
goals of the elites are determinant to understand the driving forces pushing the process 
forward and whether the implemented steps committed to these goals. We take into account 
the objectives of the privatization process and the purposes of the regimes which may lead 
to the resource allocation in the hands of the elites extending its cronyistic links and 
supporting to the evolution of cronyism. We trace the sectors of the economy being 
privatized in both countries and we detect the level of transparency, competitiveness and 
the choice of privatization techniques. We seclude several methods and instruments of 
privatization to check whether the elites use privatization as a mechanism to redistribute the 
wealth in the higher echelon of the society and path the way for the development of crony 
capitalism; 1. The privatization options, such as full or partial, concession, management 
contracts. 2. The privatization modalities, such as open tender, private placement or direct 
negotiation, or share issues for privatization, etc.; 3. The initial list of companies for 
privatization: the inefficient/loss-making enterprises or more profitable companies; 4. 
foreign participation in privatization process to ensure foreign purchase of shares. 
Thus we focus on tracing the process of privatization, determine the modalities used and 
based on the chosen options, analyze whether they supported to the real objectives of 
privatization or not. 
We rely on the Laws and Decrees on privatization, the reports and publications of World 
Bank and IMF regarding the privatization process, analyze these documents which help to 
understand the level of transparency, openness and competitiveness. For the comparative 
study, the privatization transactions data is obtained from the relevant state institutions with 
relevant data on owners and stick to World Bank Privatization Transaction Database for the 
double check which provides privatization transactions in 139 developing countries from 
1988-2008 (World Bank Privatization Database, checked 2015). The current dataset 
ensures with deals type and privatization options for the privatized companies. We also use 
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the literature published in many journals concerning the process of privatization in both 
countries. 
The limitations of World Bank Privatization Database relates to the list of the owners of 
privatized companies and sometimes deal type, as the Database gathers the corresponding 
data from national agencies which do not always provide with information on privatization 
list. In this regard, we will rely on news from leading news organizations offering a broad 
range of information on business, finance, and economy. Another obstacle is the language 
barrier for using the data from official national sources, as the official documentation in 
Morocco and Tunisia is in Arabic and on official websites may also be posted in French. In 
this case, an appropriate approach is to use the relevant materials from international 
agencies and organizations.  
We will not be able to trace all processes which might support the evolution of crony 
capitalism in the case countries. For process tracing method a thorough and wide-ranging 
search of the empirical evidence is required and we do not claim that the detected process is 
entirely sufficient to explain the outcome and for the more profound result, it will be useful 
to identify other potential mechanisms that can provide with supplemental evidence of the 
evolution of crony capitalism. 
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2. Pre-reform period and financial crisis in Morocco and Tunisia in the 1980s 
 
Oil price downward in the 1980s left several MENA region countries in debt crisis. 
Morocco and Tunisia’s economies characterized as rentier states taking rents in the form of 
oil and phosphate revenues, remittances and aid which grew rapidly during the 1960s and 
1970s (Harrigan & El-Said, 2010). However by 1983, the financial situation worsened and 
both countries found themselves unable to meet the external debt obligations (Harrigan & 
El-Said, 2010). 
After the independence, Moroccan economy was prosperous during 20 years mostly due to 
the rise in prices of its primary exporting product, the phosphate, in the international market 
(Awad & Tayem, 2015). However, the situation had changed in the 1980s in the world 
market when the phosphate prices dropped predominantly which impacted on the economic 
situation of Morocco (Awad & Tayem, 2015). Morocco found itself in a massive foreign 
debt unable to address. According to World Bank, Morocco's external debt grew 
dramatically from US$ 1.8 billion in 1975 to US$ 13.4 billion in 1983 with an increasing 
proportion being owed to commercial banks (World Bank, 1995, p. 3). By 1982 Morocco's 
external and budget deficits had both reached around 12% of Gross domestic product 
(GDP) (World Bank, 1995, p. 3). Moreover, unemployment increased significantly and 
economic growth and living standards fell at the same time (Pfeifer, 1999). 
The crisis was not only linked with the external factors but also deeply rooted in the 
economic management of the country and its weak structure.  
In the 1970s Morocco began state-led growth with control of the key sectors of the 
economy and “Moroccanization” that is at least 50% of the Moroccan firms be owned by 
Moroccan nationals (El-Khawas, 2002, p.139). Moroccanization of the national economy 
allowed the King who has a supreme power to centralize power and wealth taking direct 
ownership of the industries. The direct revenues coming from the nationalized phosphate 
industry helped the King to further nationalize other sectors, such as steel and cement 
(Friedman, 2010).  
Morocco could increase its phosphate export revenue and lead to an unprecedented 
expansion of government expenditures. Morocco’s national economy was characterized by 
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strong state domination, interventionism and protectionism, particularly in the agricultural 
sector. Local products did not have the competitive advantages in comparison with 
analogous products in the international market and the budget was exhausted to cover the 
cost recovery of the goods and services (World Bank, 1995). 
The mistakes were also apparent in trade policy.  New industrial groups with high positions 
in public administration had benefited from protectionism. These new industrial groups 
were benefited in the system of clientelism and the selective initiatives of the government 
only contributed to the channeling of the state resources to less productive sectors. 
Protectionist behavior towards these groups only deepened the discriminatory attitude 
towards the disadvantaged ones.  
The rise of demand for and the prices of phosphate stipulated the government to invest 
raising gross fixed capital formation from 14 % of GDP in 1973 to 33 % in 1977(Pfeifer, 
1999, p. 445). This policy promoted faster economic growth but simultaneously stipulated 
the increase of fiscal and trade deficit and widened the gap between savings and the 
investment (Pfeifer, 1999, p. 445). Increased public investment in all economic sectors and 
especially considerable investments in the industrial large state enterprises from phosphate 
export revenues became a burden for the state budget. With the fall in phosphate prices, 
Morocco borrowed from abroad to finance the increasing gap between revenues and 
expenditures (Awad & Tayem, 2015, p. 78). 
In addition to the external shocks, defense expenditures for the Sahara war and growing 
internal pressure to ensure social services and consumer subsidies to population led to rapid 
growth in the government current expenditures (World Bank, 1984). Morocco increased its 
external borrowings considerably to finance current account deficit and meet debt 
payments, thus raising its external medium- and long-term debt to $9 billion or 61% of 
GDP (excluding military debt) by 1982 (World Bank, 1984, p. 4).  In 1983, its total 
external debt including military and short-term commercial debt reached an estimated $13 
billion (World Bank, 1984, p. 4). As a result of growing debt and the increase in 
international interest rates, Morocco's debt service (excluding IMF) amounted to $1.2 
billion in 1980 and $1.4 billion in 1982 of which $0.6 billion in interest (World Bank, 
1984, p.4). Burdened with the external debt and unable to overcome the deepening financial 
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crisis, Morocco received the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) in 1980 but 
later abandoned as could not adopt several demanding reforms (World Bank, 1995). The 
second stabilization program was suggested in 1981, but in the light of nationwide strike 
and civil unrest, it was postponed (World Bank, 1995). On the macroeconomic level, the 
main problem still was the external debt estimated to be around 19% of GDP in 1974 and 
reached 96% of GDP, and the debt service ratio had reached almost 40% in 1983 (World 
Bank, 1995, p. 3). Mansouri and Elmorchid and Ziky and Riger mention that at the local 
level, fiscal deficits considerably went off from 2.8% of GDP in 1973 to 16.7% in 1981. 
Inflation, reached 13% in 1978 and 1981(Mansouri, Elmorchid, Ziky, & Riger, 2005, p. 5). 
In contrast to Morocco, Tunisia began a premarket strategy during the 1970s and promoted 
export-oriented growth, mostly toward Europe with pro-Western, more liberal political 
orientations (El-Khawas, 2002, p. 139). After independence, Tunisia pursued socialist 
policies, and by the late 1970s, the implemented reforms directed to some degree of 
liberalization and the encouragement of the private sector (Pfeifer, 1999). While starting a 
liberalization process, the state stayed an essential actor in the economy and had a 
regulatory power in the main sectors of the economy.  
Tunisia had impressive economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, due to the growing 
textile-manufacturing and light industries and remittances from citizens working overseas 
(El-Khawas, 2002). Increases in oil production and oil prices in the world market also 
influenced on the growth of oil income which promoted rapid economic growth 
performance (Dinh, 1984). Rapid growth of GDP, about 30 %, was conditioned by not only 
oil export and production but also to high levels of investment (World Bank, 1988). 
Despite the rapid growth the difficulties emerged when the prices of oil in the world market 
dropped which resulted in declining the rents and oil production. The fall of oil revenues 
led to foreign exchange crisis. Apart from the oil factor, the country experienced difficulties 
in public and private industries. The industries were dependent on the state protectionism 
being even not feasible. Problems arose as the inefficiency of public enterprises (PE) 
became apparent and slowed down economic growth, real wages increased faster than 
productivity in the public sector firms, while the reverse was true in the private sector 
(Pfeifer, 1999). 
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One of the policies of the government was to attract foreign investment and it was proposed 
to reduce the investment rate increasing emphasis on exports and slowing the growth of 
recurrent budget expenditures (World Bank, 1988). As the unemployment was high, the 
government decided to shift the intensive investment into the labor by creating new jobs 
(World Bank, 1988). Instead, the government continued to keep the investment high around 
32 % of GDP from 1980 to 1984 mainly in public sector with enormous capital investment 
which in reality created few jobs and did not have high economic returns (World Bank, 
1988).  
During the five year plan of recovery, the inflation rose to an average of 10.0 %, exports 
slowed and the deficit grew to 10.9% of GDP in 1984(World Bank, 1988). The purpose 
was to keep the growth high. Nevertheless, Tunisia's external debt increased to 47 % of 
GDP and the debt service ratio to 21 % (World Bank, 1988, p. 3). The government 
attempted to restrain its expenditures; nonetheless, the overall budget deficit stayed close to 
6.7% of GDP (World Bank, 1988).  
Civil riots in 1984 over higher food prices and public sector strikes in 1984 and 1985 led to 
a series of crackdowns on labor, political parties, and the press (Dillman, 1998). 
Faced with a heavy debt-service burden, Tunisia turned to the International monetary fund 
(IMF) for Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs) and then to the World Bank for SAP in exchange 
for debt relief (Pfeifer, 1999, p. 450). 
This part of the paper tended to present shortly the pre-adjustment period, the domestic 
economic policies and external factors leading to the financial crisis and instability. We 
showed that the economic and financial crisis might be the result of the economic 
development model with strong state interventionism. Both states had the same patterns of 
state domination in the economy which accompanied with external factors leading to the 
crisis. 
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5. Washington Consensus: Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
 
 5.1 Morocco 
 
    5.1.1 First Phase of Adjustment: Macroeconomic stabilization 
 
Taking into account the external enormous debt burden and harsh economic conditions, 
Morocco started negotiations with World Bank and IMF to get the first loan directed to the 
macroeconomic stabilization and initial structural reforms. The stabilization contract was 
offered in 1983 suggesting as debt relief for the start of the SAP I (Pfeifer, 1999).  
During the first phase of reforms, in total from 1983 till 1993 the comprehensive economic 
reform program was supported by seven SBAs, seven Sectoral Adjustment Loans 
(SECALs) and two Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) with the Bank. SECALs consisted 
of two loans for industry and trade (ITPALs I and II), two for agriculture; sectoral 
adjustment for agriculture (ASAL I and II), one for public enterprises restructuring (PERL 
I), one loan for education (ESAL) and one loan for financial markets development (FMDL) 
(World Bank, 1995). World Bank adjustment loans alone amounted to US$ 1.065 billion 
(World Bank, 1995, p.2).  
According to Nsouli and Rached and Funke, the reform outcomes among other various 
factors, also depend on the timing and sequencing of reforms (Nsouli, Rached & Funke, 
2002, p. 4). “The adjustment speed can be defined as the time elapsed between the move 
from an initial set of macroeconomic variables to a targeted set of such variables” (Nsouli 
et al., 2002, p. 4) as Nsouli et al. state. It also refers to the time elapsed in moving from one 
organizational structure to another like time involved in moving from a centrally planned to 
a market-oriented economy (Nsouli et al., 2002, p. 4).   
Nsouli et al. (2002) mention that “sequencing involves the order in which macroeconomic 
reforms are introduced, whether reforms are undertaken across sectors (whether fiscal 
adjustment or stabilization should be a prerequisite for introducing liberalization and price 
decontrolling) and the order in which reforms are undertaken within sectors (whether in 
case of capital account liberalization, FDI or short-term capital flows should be liberalized 
first)” (p. 4). 
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Taking into account the approaches for the speed of implementation, Morocco needed to 
adhere to one either rapid adjustment or the gradual one to implement reforms. The high-
speed adjustment referred to shock approach with rapid and surprising reforms, whereas the 
gradual approach is based on a package of incremental and multistage reforms (Nsouli et 
al., 2002, p. 4). Morocco’s destabilized financial and economic situation pushed the 
government to apply shock approach for macroeconomic stabilization plan, which is fiscal 
austerity and monetary restriction.  
IMF, operating on the conditions outlined in the “Washington Consensus,” recommended 
stabilization measures calling for massive cuts in public spending, introducing new and 
broader taxes, and high, positive interest rates (Harrigan & El-Said, 2010, p. 9). Under the 
SAL I, World Bank tended to promote the macroeconomic adjustment operations with 
several sectoral adjustment programs focusing, first of all, on stabilization of the economy 
through restrictive budgetary policies; implementation of a comprehensive program of 
adjustment of the system of protection (tariffs and quantitative restrictions), initiation a 
reform of the fiscal and financial system and reformation of the system of industrial 
incentives and export promotion (World Bank, 1984, p.8).  
To ward off inflation, as one of the primary objectives of the stabilization plan, the 
government decided to apply a restrictive monetary policy to regulate aggregate demand 
through restricting the liquidity of the economy (Mansouri et al., 2005). The government 
planned to keep consistent the monetary growth rate with the rate of growth of nominal 
GDP, as well as presented a new interest rate policy based on certain flexibility in 
1985(Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 13). Since 1985, a maximum was fixed for loan interest rates 
to dissuade banks to distribute credits with higher interest rates and a minimum was fixed 
for deposit interest rates to promote remunerated deposits and therefore to encourage 
savings (Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 13).  
To make quick corrections in a short period, Morocco undertook a fiscal adjustment 
adopting a Finance law in July 1983 to start fiscal austerity policy aiming to reduce fiscal 
deficits (Mansouri et al., 2005). The primary emphasis of the Law was on a reduction of 
consumer food subsidies. Followed the recommendations of World Bank, the government 
also adopted the measures on reduction of the wages by implementing a ‘public salary 
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freezing policy’ and limited the hiring process in the public sector (Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 
15). In spite of wage freeze during 1981-85 helping contain the public sector wage bill, the 
real problem was the excessive number of employees in public sector (World Bank, 1997). 
These were only short-term measures, whereas it was essential to implement long-term 
fiscal reforms.  
As Sewell and Thirsk mention, the tax system in Morocco was extremely weak having too 
many taxes, too many rates, too many exemptions and fine distinctions for the definition of 
tax bases, and too many special tax regimes (Sewell & Thirsk, 1997). Two most prominent 
components of direct taxes were the tax on business profits, on wages and salaries (Sewell 
& Thirsk, 1997, p. 333). The business profits tax was applied to all enterprises, no matter 
what their organizational form, and professionals' net earnings (Sewell & Thirsk, 1997, p. 
336). It was the most important source of direct tax revenue before the reforms not 
mentioning that tax on agriculture, urban property and on dividends, yielded small shares of 
total revenue (Sewell & Thirsk, 1997, p. 336). 
Under the stabilization program the target of the balance of payments deficit is set at 6.5% 
of GDP in 1985, and 4.5% in 1986 (World Bank, 1985, p. 15). For the realization of this 
target, the government decided to increase budget revenues and to limit its expenditures. 
One of the ways to increase revenues was to introduce a major reform of both direct and 
indirect taxation (World Bank, 1985). The government adopted a comprehensive tax reform 
which was complemented in 1984 with a reform of the system of indirect taxation with the 
purpose to establish a general value-added tax (VAT) over the medium-term (World Bank, 
1984, p. 9). Hence, the following years, a new VAT and a new tax on business profits and 
personal incomes were introduced correspondingly in 1986 and 1989 (Thirsk and Sewell, 
1997, p. 341). Government maximized tax revenues through better levying and enlargement 
of tax bases for existing taxes and restructured the system of taxation for incomes and 
commercial transactions, increased prices for services commercialized by SOEs (water, 
electricity, railways, etc.) (Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 15). The government imposed oil levy 
in 1986 generating revenues of about 2.7% of GDP (World Bank, 1995, p. 3).  The tax 
reforms led to the recovery of government revenues rising from 20.9 % of GDP in 1987 to 
26.4 % in 1993 (Thirsk and Sewell, 1997, p. 341).  
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In 1980 the government had initiated flexible exchange rate policy for exports 
encouragement and imports limitation which continued in 1983 with the dirham devaluated 
by about 10% (World Bank, 1984). However, Mansouri et al. emphasize that if the 
government had an intention with the devaluation of the dirham to boost exports, it might 
also be contributed to increasing prices of imported investment, intermediate goods and 
rising debt service (Mansouri et al., 2005, p.19). 
Macroeconomic imbalances were addressed by implementing public spending 
rationalization through reducing public investment and public revenue improvement 
(World Bank, 1995). The next step was to cut the government investments due to the 
shortage of resources. With the decline in spending, the government projected to decrease 
the levels of expenditure for public investment reducing from 18.7 billion Moroccan 
dirhams (MDH) to MDH 13.6 billion for 1983, and actual Treasury investment 
expenditures to decline from MDH 12.5 billion in 1982 to MDH 8 billion in 1983 (World 
Bank, 1984, p.9). PEs had become extensive accounting for 20% of GDP and 30% of all 
investment (World Bank, 1991, p. 2). The government initiated public sector reform aiming 
at financial restructuring several key public sector monopolies and utilities, establishing 
management and performance system for monopolies regulating public service enterprises 
to enhance efficiency and productivity, and initiating divestiture programs to privatize a 
significant number of SOEs (World Bank, 1991, p. 2). Besides, the government started 
cutting operating subsidies and limiting the role of the state to equity contributions (World 
Bank, 1991, p. 2). In combination with reduced public expenditures on subsidies for 
consumer goods, decrease of financial flows of the compensation funds, and cut in public 
investments in several sectors, the expenditures harshly reduced from 13% of GDP in 1982 
to only 4 % in 1986 (World Bank, 1995; Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 15). Moreover, the 
government reorganized certain inefficient public services to make the activities of SOEs 
profitable (Mansouri et al., 2005). The finance of ineffective large-scale and capital-
intensive projects was also a budget burden (World Bank, 1984). Hence many ongoing 
projects in the industrial, education and agricultural sectors had been delayed or scaled 
down to reduce costs (World Bank, 1984, p.9).  
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As a result of these measures, the fiscal deficit fell from 12% of GDP in 1983 to under 5% 
in 1987 (World Bank, 1995, p. 3).  Besides, GDP growth during the period 1983-1988 
averaged around 4.5% while inflation remained under 5% continuing to decline constituting 
3% in 1989 (World Bank, 1995).  
The government achieved the macroeconomic stabilization primarily by cutting public 
expenditures and investments. However, the revenues remained unchanged at around 
22.5% of GDP, the total external debt remained at 94% of GDP, and the debt service to 
exports ratio at 26% in 1988 (World Bank, 1995). 
The adopted policies for the reduction of budget spending by making changes in taxation, 
reducing public investment, cutting expenditures in public sector and applying restrictive 
monetary policy played an important role in macroeconomic stabilization. The continued 
macroeconomic measures were considered necessary for the essential growth of the 
economy and the solution of the debt problem. However, in spite of Morocco's 
macroeconomic achievements, unemployment remained very high, at around 15% in urban 
areas, and wealth distribution imbalances grew (World Bank, 1992, p. 5). The growth rate 
was still low and the external debt, though decreased in the following years, was still high. 
 
5.1.2   Reforms under structural adjustment programs I and II: 1983-1993 
 
Each Loan consisted of several conditions obligatory to implement in various sectors 
and our purpose is to present and discuss the reforms and applied measures taking into 
account the time of Loan allocation. During 1983-1993 Structural Adjustment Loans I and 
II implemented.  
Achieving macroeconomic stabilization, Morocco started main structural reforms relating 
to price liberalization, trade liberalization, privatization and financial sector reforms under 
SAL I Agreement.  
Moroccan decision-makers decided to undertake a relative shock approach to price 
liberalization at the beginning of the SAP intended to harmonize trade and price 
liberalization with fiscal and monetary measures (World Bank, 1995). However, Mansouri 
et al. mention that the rising severe popular dissatisfaction made them reoriented their price 
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liberalization therapy toward a more gradual approach (Mansouri et al., 2005). The 
government removed price controls to increase the competition and productivity. From 
1983 till 1985, the government initiated to eliminate price controls on about 40 products 
and services, except on subsidized food products, public utilities, and products where 
competition is limited, either as a result of the existence of natural monopolies or where 
imports were still restricted (World Bank, 1985).  
Mansouri et al. emphasize that some of them remained controlled at the provincial level, 
also the government continued to limit competition and to control prices for certain services 
on which industry heavily depends, especially transports and insurance (Mansouri et al., 
2005, p.15). As to agricultural sector the removal of price control encountered with 
challenges postponing its implementation during the following SAPs (World Bank, 1995).  
Moroccan decision-makers adopted measures in favor of trade liberalization to set up a 
market-oriented economy. The provided bank loans for industrial and trade policy 
adjustments (ITPALs I from 1984-1985 and II from 1985-1986) aimed to promote exports, 
tariff reform, import liberalization and reforms in industry. Tariff reform has been 
implemented by gradually lowering the ceiling rate for import duties (World Bank, 1987). 
Tariffs have been reduced from levels as high as 400% on some items, to a maximum of 
45% in 1988 (World Bank, 1987, p. 3).  
Following the recommendations of the World Bank, the government focused on improving 
industrial efficiency, lowering manufacturing costs, and restoring dynamism to industrial 
growth through a significant reduction of the bias against export production (World Bank, 
1985, p. 8). It was estimated that in 1978 this bias resulted in the rate of effective protection 
in the manufacturing sector which was 50% higher in import-competing sectors than in 
export-oriented activities (World Bank, 1984, p.15). Moroccan previous system of trade 
protection was significantly restrictive and practicing the export and import licensing, and 
high tariffs (World Bank, 1985). Given the fact that the government had provided 
substantial incentives to import, the applied measures directed to balance the existing bias 
against exports. The government initiated elimination of import licensing requirements and 
reduction of anti-export bias due to the failed politics of restrictive trade policies 
implemented previously. The import liberalization process included the removal of import 
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licensing on about 350 product categories and elimination of import prohibitions on 60 
product categories (World Bank, 1985, p.8). Moreover, export licensing was removed for 
all, but a few products and the monopoly of the state marketing board (OCE) on exports of 
processed food products was abolished (World Bank, 1985, p.8). This measure allowed 
firms freely choose their own commercial and shipping agent and sign their contracts, as 
well as their exports would no longer be submitted to price controls or commissions 
charged by OCE (World Bank, 1985). Another applied measure was the reform of export 
credits and export credit insurance (World Bank, 1985).  
The government reduced special import tax from 15 to 10%, the remaining prior import 
deposit requirements were eliminated, and the maximum rate of customs duty was reduced 
to 60% to decrease the excessively high incentives previously granted to some import-
substituting industries (World Bank, 1985, p.8).  
The trade liberalization policies were continued aiming to eliminate all quantitative import 
restrictions (World Bank, 1985, p.8). As a result, the share of freely imported goods rose 
from 21% of the value of imports in 1983 to 75% in 1984(World Bank, 1985, p.8). Already 
in 1992, the new trade law was based on three main principles: further freedom of imports 
and exports of goods and services, further removal of quantitative restrictions and the use 
of tariffs as the main protection instrument (Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 16). New amendments 
in law resulted in the adoption of a unique list of goods subjected to import license, 
beginning in 1992 resulting in preparing a list contained only 9.6 % of imported goods 
instead of 57 % in 1982 (Mansouri et al., 2005, p. 16). The applied measures also directed 
to reduce the maximum tariff to 35%, simplify the tariff structure, trade-related procedures 
and reduce industrial reference prices on domestic industrial production to 10% in 1992 
(World Bank, 1995, p.20).  
High customs duties also were influencing the imbalance. The government improved the 
existing custom regimes, as an important element of trade liberalization, to promote export. 
Morocco began improvement of its customs administration and customs services well 
before the SAPs however there is a necessity to develop the system for trade promotion and 
eliminate trade barriers. For this given reason, in 1983 special customs regimes for 
exporters were extended and improved and export procedures simplified (World Bank, 
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1985, p.8). The applied measures intended to do the depreciation of the effective exchange 
rate to raise the profitability for export (World Bank, 1985). In 1980-82 dirham was 
devalued its real effective exchange rate by about 6%  (World Bank, 1985, p.8). However, 
under the IMF Stand-by arrangement it was required to further reduce the bias against 
exports of the system of incentives and Morocco devalued its exchange rate by 10% in 
August 1983 (Mansouri et al., 2005). Additionally, the Moroccan policymakers reduced the 
tax burden on exports and especially on phosphate (World Bank, 1984).  
In 1973 when Morocco started Morocconization, the government was practicing policies 
directed against foreign investment and adopted measures were restricting foreign 
ownership of certain industrial, commercial, and service activities to no more than 49 % 
(Haddad & Harrison, 1993, p.4). Haddad and Harrison point out that the main purpose of 
this policy was political rather than economic aiming to reduce the dominant role of French 
firms in the Moroccan economy (Haddad & Harrison, 1993, p.4). The negative impact of 
this law on foreign investment was evident from the fact that even enterprises not subject to 
the law voluntarily handed over their capital share to their Moroccan partners (Haddad & 
Harrison, 1993, p 4). 
A significant reform of the investment code implemented in 1983 allowing full foreign 
ownership of Moroccan companies in certain sectors (especially manufacturing), eased 
restrictions on the repatriation of capital and dividends and introducing fiscal and other 
incentives for FDI (Haddad & Harrison, 1993, p 4). By 1985, the Moroccan majority-
ownership restriction no longer applied to any segment in the industrial sector, which meant 
that foreign firms could have equity participation of more than 49 % (Haddad & Harrison, 
1993, p 4).  Further liberalization of the investment code was implemented in 1988, 
adopting the simplified system of FDI approval and the rules extended to nonresident 
Moroccans similar to those granted nonresident foreigners (Haddad & Harrison, 1993, p 4). 
The Moroccan agricultural sector has one of the highest levels of state intervention in the 
world characterized by strong government involvement in production decisions, marketing, 
and international trade (Arndt & Tyner, 2001). ASAL I started in 1985 had four main 
objectives; to restructure the agricultural investment program; re-orient the prices and 
incentives framework; strengthen agricultural support services; and build institutional 
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capacity for agricultural planning and policy analysis (Arndt & Tyner, 2001). The 
government reduced agricultural subsidies on fertilizers by 40 %, water charges were 
increased and the private sector was allowed to enter into fertilizer distribution and seed 
production, the activities considered to be previously the prerogative of the state (World 
Bank, 1987, p. 3). State interventionism in exports of agricultural products was quite strict.  
Export licensing was required for practically all agricultural products. However, in 1984 the 
government reviewed the present system of export licensing and significantly reduced the 
number of products subject to it, except for subsidized basic food products (World Bank, 
1984, p. 16). These measures helped to reduce state control and intervention in export 
markets. The initial results were promising. However, Arndt and Tyner emphasize that 
some conditions in the Loan Agreement regarding the marketing and protection systems for 
agricultural commodities were not met (Arndt & Tyner, 2001). 
For the first phase of trade liberalization policies, the result of trade reform showed good 
results. Export earnings increased from 23% of GDP in 1980 to 32% in 1985 but since 
1985 earnings have stabilized between 28% and 32% (World Bank, 1995, p.10). In total, 
manufacturing exports increased from 12% to 22% of total exports, including non-factor 
services, however, despite the changes, exports remain narrowly based on a few products: 
fish, processed foods, phosphate derivatives, and clothing (World Bank, 1992, p. 2). The 
industrial sector reforms were also demonstrating positive results showing the increase of 
manufactured goods from 15% of total production in 1982 to 25% in 1988 (World Bank, 
1992, p. 2). Processed foods increased from 16% of agricultural exports in 1972 to 47% in 
1988(World Bank, 1992, p. 2). 
World Bank’s FMDL was one of the main pillars in the SAP aiming to stipulate Moroccan 
policymakers to improve policies and introduce greater competition in the financial sector. 
The objective was to establish the regulatory framework which would allow Moroccan 
financial system to operate in line with international norms and standards (World Bank, 
1991).  
Morocco's financial system included Bank Al-Maghrib (the Central Bank), 15 commercial 
banks, and five specialized credit institutions, the Treasury, the postal checking system, the 
National Savings Bank, and the Caisse Centrale de Garantie (World Bank, 1991, p. 13). 
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There were also six leasing companies, mostly owned by the banks, and several insurance 
companies (World Bank, 1991, p. 13). Capital markets were still in their infancy, and the 
Casablanca stock exchange had, so far, played a limited role in mobilizing equity finance 
(World Bank, 1991, p. 13). According to World Bank financial assessment, most banks had 
significant foreign participation in their capital and foreign shareholders typically own 20 to 
40% of the stock. In addition to the commercial banks, five government-controlled 
specialized credit institutions were lending for industrial projects, for the agricultural 
sector, to local governments, money market, to housing and tourism projects, to private 
companies engaged in public works (World Bank, 1991, p.14). Moreover, the postal 
checking system could receive deposits from the public throughout the country, as well as 
the National Savings Bank, also operating within the postal system, was collecting small 
savings from the public (World Bank, 1991, p.14). 
The Treasury had mobilized domestic resources (pension funds and social security) directly 
from households and placed most of them in Treasury, particularly in the form of deposits 
into the postal checking system and other public securities (World Bank, 1991). The main 
policymaking body on monetary and credit matters was the Credit and Financial Market 
Committee (World Bank, 1991, p.14). By achieving macroeconomic progress by mid-
1980s, the Government decided to move forward with the improvement of the financial 
sector aiming to reform the banking system.  
Extensive control of Moroccan financial system had reduced the scope of competition and 
efficiency in bank lending and deposit mobilization, and selective credit policies were also 
limiting the scope for competition and contributing to the segmentation of the credit market 
(World Bank, 1991, p. 17). Moreover, the government was practicing granting specific 
advantages to specialized financial institutions (SFIs) such as special accounting 
procedures, tax treatment and mandatory purchase of their bonds by commercial banks 
(World Bank, 1991, p. 17). The government's program included the liberalization of 
interest rates on deposits, the elimination of quantitative credit ceilings thus promoting 
competition in the banking system, strengthening the Central Bank's indirect control 
instruments, obligatory lending by commercial banks to selected sectors, and strengthening 
of the regulatory and supervisory framework of banks (World Bank, 1995, p. 11). 
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As selective credit policies had limited the scope for competition, the government decided 
to eliminate selective credit policies gradually. The gradual elimination of selective credit 
policies aimed at removing any subsidies resulted from preferential treatment granted to 
SFIs (World Bank, 1991, p. 18). Thus Banks had more flexibility in their lending decisions 
allowing competing directly with SFIs (World Bank, 1991).  
The measures applied to remove credit ceilings to have a competitive determination of 
interest rates, to free most interest rates and to implement a transparent and market-based 
foreign exchange risk coverage system (World Bank, 1991). Mansouri et al. (2005) indicate 
that “the overall objective was to break up the rigidity of old institutions characterizing the 
administrated economy and therefore to set up the bases for market finance” (p.27).   
By the adopted “Bank Law” the legal framework was reformed to unify the legislation 
concerning all credit institutions, to set up the new institutional framework to enlarge 
dialogue between monetary authorities and the bank profession and to protect bank clients 
(Mansouri et al., 2005, p.27). Full process of liberalization of direct controls on credits and 
interest rates were finished only in 1996 (Mansouri et al., 2005). By stock market reform of 
1993, the mechanisms of functioning for Casablanca Stock Market was redefined allowing 
improving the optimal allocation of financial resources transiting through the market 
(Mansouri et al., 2005, p.27).  
One of the basic components of SAP was the privatization of SOEs. World Bank promoted 
the idea of privatization policies which would constitute the base for the extensive 
privatization. In general, Morocco had a large PE sector accounting for about 20% of GDP, 
with more than half of value added in mining, energy, water supply, and roughly half of 
transport and communications (World Bank, 1995, p. 5). So, totally from about 330 firms, 
the state had a majority holding, 14 largest PEs mainly had operated in power, water, 
transport, and mining and phosphate processing (World Bank, 1995, p. 5).  
In 1986, King Hassan announced the start of a privatization emphasizing that all state 
holdings should be privatized to raise the level of efficiency of private investment and open 
key infrastructure services such as water, electricity and communications to private 
financing, to raise revenues for the government and to support for the development of 
capital markets (Najem, 2001). In 1989, a Privatization Law was passed mandating the sale 
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of 112 companies and hotels. The exception was the companies in the phosphate industry, 
electricity, water, the rail system, air transport and the telecommunications system (World 
Bank, 1995, p. 6). However, the implementation of the privatization process was conducted 
only in 1993 (Mansouri et al., 2005).  
Facing with severe economic and financial crisis in the 1980s, Morocco changed its 
economic course of development following the recommendations of IMF and World Bank, 
transforming its economy from the inward-oriented, public-sector led development into 
export-oriented and private-sector led growth economy. Monetary and exchange policies 
played an important role in macroeconomic stabilization. Undertaken actions brought the 
external debt down from 2.9 times current receipts in the balance of payments in 1988 to 
2.5 times in 1993 (World Bank, 1995 p.33). The deficit in the current account in the 
balance of payments was reduced substantially, from an equivalent of 4.4% of GDP in 1989 
to some 2% of GDP in 1993(World Bank, 1995, p. 34). Foreign investment increased on 
average in dollars 35.2% on an annual basis between 1988 and 1993, rising from US$129 
million in 1988 to US$584 million in 1993(World Bank, 1995, p. 34). Inflation was under 
control and the stabilization was achieved, economic growth was nevertheless satisfactory 
until 1991, more than 5% on average per year (World Bank, 1995, p. 34). The economic 
growth as one of the main objectives of both SALs was satisfactory until 1991, but because 
of droughts in 1992 and 1993, the growth decreased. The poverty was another problem that 
could not be appropriately tackled, especially in rural areas. Poverty constituted around 20 
% of the population, and urban unemployment, about 22 % (World Bank, 1995). The 
increase in agricultural production ensured growth to some extent in urban employment and 
with some income benefits to the poor, but the total budgetary transfers to the population 
declined, mainly because of the reduction in food subsidies which target some of the poor 
(World Bank, 1992, p. 16). Since Morocco had substantial external debt, one of the 
components of the Loan was the improvement of external debt management which was 
addressed by establishing debt management system allowing having a more reliable 
analysis of the country’s debt profile (World Bank, 1995). However, the debt service 
payments will be one of the acute problems for the government in the following years. As 
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to implemented structural and sectoral reforms, the result was promising but with the 
necessary improvements need to be addressed. 
 
5.1.3   Reinforcement of structural reforms: 1994-2001 
 
While the profound transition has been implemented and SALs during the 1980s and at 
the beginning of 1990s, but the World Bank and IMF tended to provide specific loan for the 
improvements in various economic sectors.  
Two SAPs aimed to lessen the role of the state in economic regulations and as it was shown 
the results were evident. However, the necessity of extensive reforms still was in demand. 
Morocco’s strategy for the 1990s aimed to continue the reforms directed toward an 
outward-oriented economy.  
Since the 1990s the economic performance was slowed down and particularly droughts in 
1992, 1993 and 1995 significantly influenced on economic growth, increasing poverty and 
urban unemployment (World Bank, 1997).  GDP growth was negative during the drought 
years, the fiscal deficit rose from 2.2 % of GDP to 5.7 % between 1992 and 1995, and the 
current account deficit widened from 1.7 % of GDP to 4.9 %, leading to a reduction in the 
level of reserves (World Bank, 1997, p. 2). 
Droughts specifically affected the increase of poverty in rural areas. Urban unemployment 
has also increased rapidly, reaching 23 % in 1995 and poverty was back to its level in the 
early 1980s (World Bank, 1997). The budget deficit was still too high and moreover the 
structure of its expenditures was not growth-oriented, as 24% of revenue was used to 
service interest on the public debt and 47% toward paying the wage bill (World Bank, 
1997). Public expenditures were inefficient and poorly allocated (World Bank, 1997). 
In parallel, in 1996 the constitutional referendum took place introducing a new two-
chamber Parliament made up of a Lower House elected by universal suffrage and an Upper 
House by representatives of regional and local communities (World Bank, 1997). Main 
opposition parties formed a new coalition government for the first time in 1997 since 
Morocco's independence, and in 1999 King Mohammed VI acceded to the throne after his 
father, King Hassan II death (World Bank, 2005). Reform of local governments adopted in 
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1996 allowed ensuring more autonomy on a local level and efforts for decentralization 
(World Bank, 2005). 
During the mid-1990s the government continued deepening macroeconomic stability as 
well as structural changes in trade liberalization, customs reform, financial sector reforms, 
private sector development, and privatization.  
The government adopted several measures for trade liberalization to achieve necessary 
results in outward-oriented policy, especially in the fields of transportation, energy and 
agricultural modernization. In 1994 liberalization included basic agricultural products 
(grains, sugar, oilseeds) and liberalization of energy products was moved forward to 
January 1, 1995 (World Bank, 2001). Trade liberalization also led to an Association 
Agreement signed with the European Union in 1996 and implemented in March 2000 
(World Bank, 2005). Licensing system also was subjected to improvements, but it was only 
applied to products covered by international agreements signed by Morocco (World Bank, 
1995).  
Since 1990, most restrictions on foreign ownership had been lifted and FDI rose from about 
0.9 % of GDP to an annual average of 1.7 % in 1992 and a high 2.8 % of GDP in 1994 
(World Bank, 1997, p. 1). Following the international norms and standards, by the Decree 
of 1998, the government initiated public procurement reform aimed to maintain the 
principle of competition, transparency and efficiency in public procurement, to develop 
integrity in the public procurement management, to enhance guarantees provided to 
competitors and strengthen the settlement of disputes (Bensouda, 2012, p. 2126). 
As customs duties were the vital source of revenue accounting for 4.2% of GDP in 1995, 
the authorities paid significant attention to the improvement of the system, and the process 
of dismantling customs duties accelerated particularly after signing the trade agreement 
with European Union, (De Wulf & Finateau, 2002).  Morocco was obliged to abolish 
customs duties by 2010 (De Wulf & Finateau, 2002). Customs duties were lowered on 
some non-agricultural products (De Wulf & Finateau, 2002). Finance Law allowed 
reducing tariffs to 5% on a large number of imports that had not competed with domestic 
products. In 2000 to simplify import duties, the fiscal levy on imports (PFI) was 
incorporated into customs tariffs. In 1996-2000 annual revenue from customs fell to 3.6 % 
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of GDP, while revenue from the VAT on imports rose to 3.3 % of GDP (De Wulf & 
Finateau, 2002). As to measures directed boosting export, the government granted certain 
benefits under customs regimes. Enterprises benefited from the free export zone regime 
(WTO, 2003). The system of subsidies extended for the exports of certain agricultural 
products, however keeping levies to exports of maize, plant fiber and crude phosphates 
(WTO, 2003).  
A package of policy measures was applied for reforming the tax system.  The government 
lowered the maximum personal and corporate income taxes and reduced the tax on stock 
dividends (World Bank, 1995).  
During the SAP I and II periods, to support to private sector development the government 
increased the share of private sector in the economy. During the mid-1990s the private 
sector accounted for an increasingly significant share of economic activity in Morocco, 
about 70 % of value added, 90% of employment and 75 % of investment and it contributed 
virtually all of the value added in agriculture, commercial construction and trade, 75 % of 
industry, and 70 % of banking and financial institutions (World Bank, 1995, p. 5). 
However, despite the applied policies, PE sector still constituted the important part of the 
economy. It still accounted for about 20 % of GDP, with more than half of value added in 
mining, energy, water supply, and roughly half of transport and communications (World 
Bank, 1995, p. 5).  Policy measures of the 1990s related to the increase of private sector 
investment and to ensure private sector growth. Profound privatization of PE sector was 
required to reduce the budget deficit and open the key sectors of the economy for private 
financing. Moreover, privatization would raise revenues and contribute to the development 
of capital markets (World Bank, 1995, p. 5). In October 1994, the Minister of Privatization 
launched the second phase of the privatization program covering key infrastructure sectors 
such as water, electricity, transport, and communication (World Bank, 1995). At the end of 
April 1995, some thirty companies had been sold generating revenues of 7.2 billion MDH 
(US$785 million) (World Bank, 1995, p. 6).  
Morocco's policy of liberalization and privatization in communication was considered as 
auspicious. This success was conditioned by structural reforms and Morocco’s membership 
to World Trade Organization’s commitment to gradually liberalize the telecommunication 
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services (World Bank, 2005). A new Telecommunications Law of 1997 had been drafted 
supporting the creation of an independent telecommunications company operating on 
commercial principles (World Bank, 1995). Post Office and Telecommunications Board 
were restructured and two entities were created in 1998: Itissalat Al-Maghrib (IAM) or 
Maroc Telecom S.A. for telecommunications, and Barid Al-Maghrib for postal services 
(Achy, 2005, p.3). The law also set up the National Telecommunications Regulation 
Agency, an independent entity in charge of regulating the telecommunications services 
(Achy, 2005, p.3).  
The previous reforms in the financial system of Morocco were considered quite successful 
from an institutional perspective, but the role of markets was still limited as the government 
was still the owner of the most of the financial institutions. The level of competition outside 
of the banking system tended to be limited as a result of the dominant position of three 
large private financial conglomerates (IMF, 2006). Government-controlled institutions still 
held around 43% of all banking system assets at the end of 2001 (IMF, 2006). Though the 
reforms helped to increase the role of private sector in non-bank financial institutions, the 
substantial presence of the state was apparent (IMF, 2006). Hence, the extensive role of the 
government, limited competition led to the uneven development of the system which in 
turn could not sufficiently contribute to the economic growth of the country.  
In the financial sector, in 1995 a new financial adjustment program Financial Markets 
Development Loan (FMDL) was confirmed and the government supported to indirect 
monetary control including the liberalization of lending rates (World Bank, 1995). 
According to Jbili and Klaus and Volker, limited controls on some deposit rates remained 
(Jbili, Klaus & Volker, 1997). Indirect and market-based instruments of monetary policy 
were also developed, stock market legislation was updated, the bourses were privatized, 
and independent supervisory institutions were established (Jbili et al., 1997).   
Under new banking and Central Bank laws, the government strengthened the regulation and 
supervision of the financial system. New banking laws granted increased autonomy to the 
central banks and strengthened prudential regulations in line with international standards 
(Jbili et al., 1997, p. 30). Virtual full convertibility had been established for foreign 
investors, and restrictions on foreign borrowing and certain outward investments by 
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residents were relaxed (Jbili et al., 1997, p. 30). In 1996 Morocco established interbank 
foreign exchange markets directed to the decentralization of the management of foreign 
exchange (Jbili et al., 1997, p. 30). 
Under FMDL Loan privatization was implemented regarding the financial sector in 1994 
and 1995 and ten financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, and a large financial 
holding) were successfully privatized contributed about 30% of total value added of the 
sector (World Bank, 1995, p. 7). In 1995 the new single document called the “Investment 
Charter” investment code was adopted replacing acting code of 1983 to promote 
investments through the improvement of the investment conditions (Bouoiyour, 2007). The 
investment law included separate sectoral codes covering industry, tourism, housing, 
maritime, mining, petroleum exploitation and exports except for the agricultural sector 
(Bouoiyour, 2007).  
In parallel to the reinforcement of the reforms, Morocco also continued stabilization 
programs pursuing monetary policies. Inflation was kept under control below 3% (World 
Bank, 2001). The government had relied more on domestic financing sources to meet fiscal 
needs and gradually reduced external debt to about 55 % of GDP in 1997, and domestic 
debt amounted to 43 % of GDP (World Bank, 2001, p.4). Because of droughts, growth 
dropped from an annual average of 4.4 % during 1986-1991 to 1.9 % during 1991-1998, 
turning Morocco from one of the best to one of the worst performers in the MENA Region 
(World Bank, 2001, p.5). The fiscal deficit was mostly covered by cuts in public 
investment, while the wage bill remained high (World Bank, 2001). Liberalization of 
financial sectors had been done by gradually eliminating almost all regulations that ensured 
direct state intervention in the economy. Despite the progress in recent years implemented 
in various sectors, Morocco confronted challenges, especially regarding economic growth. 
The country was vulnerable to rainfall registered low living standards, social disparities 
between regions and high unemployment rates as well as the increase in poverty. Among 
the continued structural reforms, these challenges will be one of the priorities for the 
government to combat in the following years. 
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 5.1.4   Last phase of extensive structural reforms: 2001-2011 
 
As a result of policies implemented in the early 1990s in many areas such as trade 
facilitation, customs reform, financial sector liberalization, telecom privatization, 
agriculture and public sector modernization, Morocco was significantly ahead of the 
economic environment in 1980s. 
As to the macroeconomic stability, inflation remained low, and successful privatization 
attracted FDI. Inflows from tourism and remittances were stable and high. However, in 
late 2002, the main concerns of the government were low growth, unemployment and 
fiscal sustainability (World Bank, 2005). The country was vulnerable to variable rainfall 
and growth in Morocco was highly dependent on weather (World Bank, 2007). Growth 
remained somewhat vulnerable to agriculture, whereas dependency on agriculture to 
rainfalls was significant (World Bank, 2005). On the contrary, non-agricultural output 
continued to grow, slowly but steadily, at a rate of 3.2 %, with dynamic contributions 
from the manufacturing and service sectors such as tourism and information technology 
(World Bank, 2005). Morocco also had high energy import dependency, so it was 
vulnerable to instabilities in the international oil market.  As to living standards, the 
problem of poverty was still a challenge and large segments of the population remain 
socially and economically marginalized (World Bank, 2007).  
Fiscal sustainability remained one of the main problems. During the last privatization 
process, half of the financing of the fiscal deficit came from the privatization proceeds, 
but it phased out and there was a necessity to make the fiscal adjustment in 2005-2006 
(World Bank, 2005). The government needed to implement medium-term fiscal 
consolidation strategy relying on a mix of expenditure and revenue measures (IMF, 
2006). On the expenditure side, the authorities decided to reduce wage bill growth, the 
fiscal cost of energy subsidies by gradually adjusting domestic petroleum prices to 
international prices, gradually replace inefficient food subsidies and to switch to 
performance-based budgeting within a medium-term expenditure framework (IMF, 
2006, p.11). On the revenue side, the objectives were to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of the tax system, particularly of the VAT (reducing number of rates), and 
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strengthen domestic revenue mobilization to offset revenue losses from continued trade 
liberalization (IMF, 2006, p.11). There was a necessity to improve the overall efficiency 
of public spending to have sustainability of expenditure savings and the government 
with the advice of IMF implemented a broad civil service reform helping to gradually 
curb wage bill growth (IMF, 2006, p.11). By 2005 Early Retirement Program, the size of 
the civil service reduced and 39,500 employees (8 % of the civil service) left under the 
voluntary program (IMF, 2006, p.11). The subsidy system was reformed to improve the 
inefficient current subsidy system by reducing the cost of food subsidies (0.8 % of GDP 
in 2005) and better targeting the most vulnerable groups (IMF, 2006, p.12).  
Comprehensive reform in energy sector helped to reduce the fiscal cost of energy 
subsidies (1.6 % of GDP in 2005) (IMF, 2006, p.12). The authorities’ medium-term 
objective was to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 % of GDP and to bring the public debt to 
GDP ratio below 60 % (IMF, 2006, p.12). By the budget law of 2007, the government 
was trying to reduce a deficit of about 13.5% of GDP (IMF, 2006, p.12). Due to applied 
measures and reforms the public debt to GDP ratio declined to 57.4 % of GDP, down 
from 62.7 % the previous year, the budget deficit was reduced to 2.7 % of GDP, down 
from 5.8 % of GDP in 2005 (World Bank, 2007, p. 2). 
For integration to the world economy, Morocco signed Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States in March 2004 (IMF, 2006). The government initiated several sectoral 
reforms in tourism, industrial and service sectors. The Plan Azur supported the 
expansion of the tourism sector, the Plan Emergence of 2005, aimed both at modernizing 
the existing industrial sectors, such as the textile industry, and facilitating the expansion 
of new industrial sectors and service activities (IMF, 2006, p.15). The authorities 
implemented a broad range of incentives to foster the development of offshoring 
activities, including tax incentives, and the outfitting of four offshore zones (IMF, 2006, 
p.15).  
The modifications in public procurement regulations in the following year had closely 
related the process of transparent management of public services. Law on public services 
management of 2006 facilitated the process for public entities and local authorities were 
allowed concluding a partnership with private service for the performance of public 
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service(EBRD, 2013, p.3). Moroccan authorities had issued new public procurement 
regulations in 2007 aimed to fill the identified gaps of the 1998 Decree (OECD, 2009, p. 
9). The new Decree set the conditions and terms for public procurement applicable to 
central government and local authorities regarding competition (scope for informing 
firms of tender notices) and transparency (negotiated contracts, an automatic notification 
for unsuccessful tenderers, etc.) (OECD, 2009, p. 9). Morocco was still in the process of 
the improvement of legislation concerning property rights and specifically for 
commercial rights to be in line with the European Union standards (Morocco - 
Protection, 2017). Morocco streamlined the process for registration and transfer of 
property, but rates of land titling and land rights registration were still low (Heritage 
Foundation, 2018, p. 305). The law was well defined however because of judiciary lack 
of independence, implementation of property rights was threatened (Morocco - 
Protection, 2017). Morocco permitted foreigners to own land, although they were 
prohibited from possessing the agricultural land (Morocco - Protection, 2017).   
Under Financial Sector Development Policy Loan in 2005, the government was obliged 
to strengthen financial sector's legal, regulatory and supervisory framework f, as well as 
the restructuring of weak public financial institutions (World Bank, 2005). In the 
banking sector, the amended law on Central Bank (Bank AL-Maghreb (BAM)) provided 
more autonomy to the Central Bank to implement monetary policy, banking supervision 
and authority to intervene in troubled commercial banks. Broadening banking 
supervision to institutions previously excluded from regulatory oversight strengthened 
BAM authority (World Bank, 2005, p. 6). Such institution was the Caisse de Depot et de 
Gestion, a non-bank financial institution which had a significant role through its 
management of pension fund assets, ownership interests in state-owned banks, 
investments in national development projects, and substantial holdings of government 
securities (World Bank, 2005, p. 6). Pursuing the goal of gradually decreasing the role of 
government in the banking sector, its share in private commercial banks dropped from 
40% in 2002 to 23% presently in 2007 (World Bank, 2008). The restructuring of the 
former specialized state-owned banking sector was mostly complete, mainly the 
institutional and financial reorganization of Credit Immobilier et Hotelier (CIH) and 
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Credit Agricole du Maroc (CAM) (World Bank, 2008). The policy of liberalization of 
the capital account and increased flexibility of the exchange rate in the medium term 
was one of the objectives of the government (World Bank, 2008). In 2007, the 
authorities lifted certain restrictions on transactions by residents and increased the scope 
for financial institutions, banks and enterprises to invest abroad, at the same time, 
transactions by non-residents had been already liberalized (World Bank, 2008).  
During following years, the authorities will try to address the fiscal risks and to keep 
inflation stable and low, but since 2009 Morocco will experience series of shocks related 
to international crisis and the political developments of Arab spring. According to 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), during the Arab Spring, the 
Moroccan government attempted to buy social peace by spending 20% of its budget on 
subsidizing bread, fuel, and electricity which brought Morocco’s deficit to 6% of its 
GDP in 2012 (BTI, 2016). Government expenditures increased from 27.4% to 29.9% of 
GDP and government debt from 46.5% to 64.6% since 2009 (BTI, 2016, p. 17).  
Since the 1980s the liberalization principles applied in Morocco which reinforced later 
by Washington Consensus as a package of comprehensive structural reforms, aimed at 
promoting deep structural changes. IFIs institutionalized neoliberalism in the framework 
of Washington Consensus as a model of development for developing countries. In the 
context of critical crisis deep structural reforms aimed to decrease the role of state 
intervention in the economy and diminish protectionist policies in various sectors. Under 
SAP I and II, Morocco applied first restrictive budgetary policies implementing massive 
cuts in public spending and planned a strategy to address the problem of expenditures 
and revenues. Following the recommendation of World Bank and IMF, the government 
reduced wage bill growth (civil service reform reducing the size of civil service), cut the 
energy and food subsidies. However, harsh methods to stabilize expenditures resulted in 
the increase of unemployment and poverty in urban areas.  
After fiscal adjustment, trade liberalization and price decontrolling followed with the 
program adjustment of the new system of protection by eliminating quantitative 
restrictions, new tax system, as well as the reform of the financial system, the system of 
incentives and export promotion. Despite the implemented trade liberalization, the 
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Moroccan agricultural sector, considered to have the high level of protectionism, 
remained under state control especially in exports of agricultural products requiring 
licensing.   
The increased autonomy of Central Bank allowed reinforcing prudential regulations. 
Though the reforms helped to improve the financial system, the role of the government 
was still extensive. Limited competition led to the uneven development of the system 
which in turn could not sufficiently contribute to the economic growth of the country. 
The profound privatization of PE sector allowed opening the key sectors of the economy 
for private financing. Privatization was also considered as the source of raising revenues 
which would contribute to the development of capital markets. 
The property rights legislation improved considerably. Nevertheless, because of 
judiciary’s lack of independence, the implementation of property rights raises questions. 
Though foreigners were allowed to have properties/lands in Morocco, this regulation 
prohibited them from owning agricultural lands.  
The neoliberal model of development was considered by IFIs neoliberalism promotors 
as a panacea for all client countries under debt burden and an only bargain to get new 
international financial assistance in the form of loans. The package of policies in trade 
and price liberalization, financial sector and privatization was considered the only way 
to ensure market competitiveness. Those reforms were deemed to be significant to 
ensure growth, but the goal of World Bank and IMF for the promised growth and 
sustainability turned into increased unemployment and widespread poverty in Morocco. 
Moreover, the applied shock measures and then the low pace of harsh reforms of 
liberalization in Morocco were accompanied by weak institutional capacities and 
continued resistance by the government to implement the reforms, particularly in sectors 
where the state control was powerful. 
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  5.2 Tunisia 
 
  5.2.1 Macroeconomic stabilization  
 
In the mid-1980s, the economic situation in Tunisia was worsening with external current 
account deficit reaching a record level (10.9% of GDP) and encountering serious 
difficulties in borrowing abroad (World Bank, 1991). By 1985, debt outstanding had risen 
to 50% of GDP and the debt service ratio to 22% (World Bank, 1991).  
In 1986 the decline of oil prices, the fall of hydrocarbon exports volume, lower revenues 
from tourism, workers' remittances, and the rise of unemployment was putting further 
pressure on the balance of payments (World Bank, 1991). The decline in net hydrocarbon 
exports required the development of other sources of export revenues and import 
substitution (World Bank, 1987, p. 5). Moreover, high and growing unemployment and 
underemployment rate and the growing rate of active population was alos a challenge 
requiring urgent meausures (World Bank, 1987, p. 5). Inflation rose to an average of 10% 
over this period, and exports slowed (World Bank, 1995, p. 1). Though the policies directed 
to keep growth high, at about 4.5 %, but the authorities continued external borrowing, 
constituting 46 % of GDP by 1984 (World Bank, 1995, p. 1). Faced with a heavy debt-
service burden, Tunisia turned to the IMF for a Stand-by agreement and then to the IMF 
and World Bank for SAP in exchange for debt relief (Pfeifer, 1999, p. 450). By late 1985 
and 1986, the response to the situation was the preparation of a medium-term adjustment 
strategy by the World Bank both at the macroeconomic stabilization and reforms in the 
industrial and the agricultural sectors.  
In general, SAL had a broad objective to adjust the expenditures taking into account the 
debt burden and the decline in oil revenues, as well as to create conditions for rapid growth 
of an economically efficient private sector and strengthen the increasing export orientation 
of the economy (World Bank, 1988). 
Several Loans were signed under the single SAL lasting from 1987-1991. The 
corresponding sectoral loans related to agriculture and industry and trade, and PEs 
restructuring: Two Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loans (ASAL), an Industry and Trade 
Policy Adjustment Loan (ITPAL) and Public enterprises restructuring Loan (PERL), as 
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well as Economic and Financial Reform Support Loan. Specifically, the sectoral loan for 
agriculture aimed to focus on improvements of agricultural policies in the areas of 
incentives and pricing (at the consumer and producer levels), public expenditure, etc. 
(World Bank, 1991). ITPAL focused on measures to support the first stage of industrial 
pricing and trade liberalization (World Bank, 1988). The mission of PERL was to improve 
management and competitiveness of PEs, support private sector development through 
privatization and financial/technical recovery of certain enterprises in need (World Bank, 
1995).  
Tunisia needed to make the economy more outward oriented, and in this regard, primary 
reform areas were trade liberalization, price liberalization, financial sector reforms and 
taxation. Stabilization as the first phase of the adjustment process started in 1985 (World 
Bank, 1992).  
Tunisia adhered to the gradual implementation of reforms. In comparison with Morocco 
where severe economic condition pushed the government to apply shock therapy, Tunisia’s 
macroeconomic environment was very close to being in crisis but still allowed to adhere to 
the gradual implementation of reforms.  
Austere measures were applied to bring the macroeconomic environment to balance by 
reducing aggregate demand in the economy through some steps; cuts in public spending, 
consumption, and investment (World Bank, 1993). Macroeconomic stabilization aimed to 
introduce wage and salary policy, the investment incentives for high priority projects, a 
competitive exchange rate, an upward adjustment of interest rates, to decrease budget 
deficit, to liberalize economy including the abolition of price controls and to eliminate 
quantitative restrictions on imports and reform of the tariff system (World Bank, 1991).   
One of the first stabilization measures was the depreciation of the Tunisian dinar (TD) by 
23 % in nominal terms in 1986, yielding 17 % depreciation in real terms over the year 
(World Bank, 1987). In 1985, the government introduced a flexible exchange rate system to 
maintain the real effective value of the TD and ensure the international competitiveness of 
the Tunisian economy (World Bank, 1987). 
With flexible exchange rate, the government could the rise in the value of the TD to the 
currencies of partner countries and improve competitiveness on the export markets (World 
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Bank, 1987, p.57). The next step was the liberalization of interest rates. Mostly liberalizing 
interest rates allowed bringing up to positive levels in real terms during 1985-86 (World 
Bank, 1991, p. 5). By 1987, the government set free 75% of lending rates except those for 
agriculture, exports, small and medium enterprises, energy efficiency projects and about 
two-thirds of interest rates on commercial banks' deposits were also decontrolled (World 
Bank, 1991, p. 5).  
Regarding monetary and credit policy, the government planned the steps to decline budget 
deficits. As to monetary and credit policy, the Central Bank reduced net credit to financial 
institutions by TD 140 million in 1987, and by a further TD 283 million in 1988 as the 
liquidity of the economy (deposits, capital accounts, and other items) increased (World 
Bank, 1991, p.5). The existing credit policy toward agricultural sector inhibited the 
development of a private banking sector and allowed for extremely low levels of repayment 
(World Bank, 1991, p.8). The government reduced its budgetary allocations to the loan 
component of its principal subsidized credit program (World Bank, 1991, p.8).  
From 1980 to 1984, investment was quite high, around 31 % of GDP and notably, the 
public sector was characterized by substantial capital investment in inefficient investment 
projects could provide few jobs and had low economic returns (World Bank, 1993). Wages 
increased in real terms and excessed productivity increases (World Bank, 1993). In 1985 
and 1986 the government introduced a program of reducing budget deficits first by sharply 
decreasing public investment and mainly cutting government’s contribution towards PE 
investments. The public sector in Tunisia was quite large including 600 PEs where the state 
was holding at least 10% ownership and accounted for about 25-30% of value added, 30% 
of formal sector employment excluding agriculture, nearly half of total enterprise 
investments, and 75 % of export earnings. The overall increase in indebtedness mirrored in 
the PE (World Bank, 1989). The public sector had the problem of excess employment. The 
reduction of excess employment and restructuring or liquidating of targeted PE helped to 
solve the problem of public expenditures (World Bank, 1995). A program of the 
restructuring of unprofitable enterprises under PERL Loan reduced budgetary transfers 
from 7% of GDP in 1990 to 4 %  in 1994 (World Bank, 2004, p.10). The next step in PE 
reform would be the quick privatization process.  
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The government approved measures on reduction of public investment to cover the gap in 
the budget deficit. The project selection criteria were set to implement the reduction of the 
development project expenditures to improve the efficiency of public investments and for 
the decrease of expenditures in commercially feasible areas to ensure a space for the private 
sector (World Bank, 1991). Due to these measures decline in 1987 mainly contributed to 
the fall in total investment as a share of GDP from 23.5% in 1986 to 20.3% in 1987 and 
18.8% in 1988 (World Bank, 1991, p. 5). Another aspect of fiscal reforms was the lowering 
of the expenditures for subsidies. Subsidies used up almost 11% of overall budgetary 
resources and accounted for 3.5% of GDP (World Bank, 1993, p. 22). Under the SAL, it 
was agreed to reduce the subsidies and raised prices primarily on the less sensitive 
consumer items, such as fertilizer subsidies, barley and soya (World Bank, 1993, p. 22).  
For mobilization of resources of revenues, the government improved collection of direct 
taxes, VAT, as well as raised sales taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco (World Bank, 
1992). By fiscal measures, reforms of the indirect and direct tax systems were introduced. 
The VAT was established in 1988 to replace three turnover taxes- a multiplicity of rates (13 
different rates), and a group of excise taxes (45 different tax rates) (World Bank, 1993, p. 
19). In contrast, the new VAT now had only three rates; the principal rate was at 17%, but 
basic consumption items and professional services would pay 6% and luxuries would be 
levied a rate of 29% (World Bank, 1993, p. 20). So, the new system was much simpler with 
an incidence of the tax enlarged and the marginal rate of taxation reduced (World Bank, 
1993). Next year the reduced rate of taxation was applied to wholesale trade, excluding 
foodstuffs. As to direct tax reform, it affected both personal and corporate incomes, which 
put all these taxes under a unified direct tax, eliminating the double taxation of dividend 
income (World Bank, 1993, p. 22). It took effect for personal incomes earned in 1990 by 
setting the highest marginal tax rate on personal incomes at 35%, and extended to 
corporations in 1991 based on a normal rate of 35% and a low rate of 10% for agriculture, 
small enterprises, and special ventures, such as retail cooperatives (World Bank, 1993, p. 
22). The revenue from direct taxes increased by 15% from 1990 to 1991 (World Bank, 
1993, p. 22).  
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By introducing wage and salary policy, the government intended to control the rapid rise of 
wages initially through a wage freeze policy, and then, allow nominal wage increases with 
productivity growth (World Bank, 1993). The purpose was to bring real wages in line with 
economic reality. Real average salaries declined by 2.9% in 1987 and rose by only 1.2% in 
1988(World Bank, 1991, p. 5). 
The efforts directed to stabilize macroeconomic environment were satisfactory as the 
policies for reduction of budget imbalances gave the desired results. A positive real interest 
rate and a reduction in the fiscal deficit contributed to a rise in gross domestic savings from 
19.5 % in 1986 to 21.9 % in 1994 (World Bank, 2004). 
The prudent credit and monetary policies kept inflation contained at 7.2% in 1987 and 
further lowered it to 6.3% in 1988, and already in 1995, it was 5.8% (World Bank, 1988). 
  
5.2.2   First phase of structural adjustment program: 1987- 94 
 
Simultaneously with stabilization plan, liberalization policies were launched. The 
peculiarity of Tunisian industrial enterprises was in the preferential treatment of export 
producers vs. domestic market producers. One group producing for export market 
exempted from import duties and benefitted from a very favorable fiscal treatment and a 
group of domestic market producers was heavily protected by import duties and non-tariff 
barriers (World Bank, 1992). According to the World Bank Report, in 1988 over 90 % of 
domestic agricultural and manufacturing production was protected by non-tariff restrictions 
on imports (World Bank, 1991). First of all, producer prices were decontrolled for a group 
of well-established industries (World Bank, 1991, p. 6). The important step was the 
reduction of high import tariffs and the elimination of disparities in effective protection 
levels between various sectors of the economy (World Bank, 1987). The government 
prepared the gradual tariff reductions policy with an aim to achieve a lower and reasonably 
uniform effective protection rate of about 25% (World Bank, 1991, p. 6). Tariffs were 
compressed from a range of 5%-235% to a range of 15%-50% in 1987 and 15%-41% in 
1988, and all other import taxes were eliminated or incorporated in tariffs (World Bank, 
1991, p. 6).  
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 The government phased out quantitative restrictions to improve incentives for export 
production, except for capital goods (World Bank, 1987, p.12). Liberalization started with 
spare parts essential for use in industry, agriculture, hotels, hospitals, raw materials for 
production pharmaceutical items and semi-finished products for enterprises that export at 
least 25% of their output, and capital goods for new investment projects (World Bank, 
1987, p.12). In agriculture sector in compliance with the ASAL, the adjustment of producer 
and input prices were set, distribution margins for fertilizer were liberalized and interest 
rates for agricultural credit were raised (World Bank, 1988, p.26). In 1986, as an additional 
incentive for exports, firms exporting more than 25% of their turnover were allowed to 
import all of the inputs they needed freely, and this policy was extended to firms exporting 
a minimum of 15% of their turnover in 1987 (World Bank, 1991, p. 6). Imports of capital 
goods and the remaining semi-finished were liberalized in 1988, and as a result, about 75% 
of all imports liberalized by the end of 1988 (World Bank, 1987, p.12). Remaining 
quantitative restrictions, mainly those on consumer goods abolished already in 1989-90 
(World Bank, 1992). The share of imports subject to quantitative import restrictions was 
reduced to 74% of the output value of the agricultural, fishery and manufacturing sectors by 
February 1991(World Bank, 1992, p. 13). 
The strategy of the government over price control abolition was conducted in all other 
industries with the exception of a few specific investment and agricultural products the 
prices must remain regulated for social reasons (World Bank, 1993). Despite the measures 
implemented towards price liberalization, a considerable degree of price controls remained 
within the economy, specifically commodities subject to monopoly enterprises of products 
(World Bank, 1993). By 1991, the percentage of products' prices had been decontrolled by 
60% (World Bank, 1993). 
As a part of SAP, the Tunisian government adhered to financial liberalization and the 
implementation of the relevant reforms. An essential part of implemented reforms was the 
liberalization of the banking sector. Tunisia was previously pursuing the economic 
development strategy focusing on the strong role and control of the state over various 
sectors of the economy and the financial sector was under the state strict direct control. 
According to Cook and Hababou and Roberts (2001) “one of the foremost functions of the 
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financial sector was to collect savings at low cost and redirect them to government and PEs, 
as well as to priority business sectors.” (p.2). The state intervention was also significant in 
regulating credit allocation and interest rates, limiting foreign presence in the financial 
sector (Cook et al., 2001). The government ensured its presence in the banks appointing its 
representatives to boards of the most banks, thus getting control over banking regulations 
(Cook et al., 2001). Moreover, non-performing loans (NPL) were a significant portion of 
bank assets (20%) in government bonds and banks were under pressure to lend to priority 
sectors at concessional rates of interest and the resultant accumulation of loans to highly 
leveraged borrowers (World Bank, 1988, p. 19). Foreign investment was quite restrictive 
and required authorities’ approval, which means that capital flows were tightly regulated 
(Cook et al., 2001). Following the recommendations of IMF, the government had to reform 
the commercial banks' ՛ system to create competition and make sure to have an efficient 
allocation of resources. In 1987 interest rates were liberalized and banks were allowed to 
make their own credit allocation decisions, as well as in 1988, the requirement for prior 
authorization by the central bank for credit decisions was eliminated and in 1990 bank 
financing for some PEs at preferential rates ceased (Cook et al., 2001). The new system of 
loan classification was established and the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for 
bank loans was removed above a certain size (World Bank, 1988, p.18). The important step 
implemented regarding Treasury bills to make it more attractive for insurance companies 
and other non-financial institutions. Treasury bills redesigned to make them more liquid, 
and in 1991, the Treasury stopped issuing low-interest, long-term government bonds and 
Treasury bills had been sold through an auction system since 1989, making gradually 
accessible also for the general public in 1995 (Cook et al., 2001). Restriction upon foreign 
participation was abolished to increase outside competition, thus opening banks' capital to 
foreign participation and in 1994 the establishment of interbank foreign exchange markets 
in Tunisia signaled the beginning of decentralizing of the management of foreign exchange 
(Cook et al., 2001). Though under new Banking Law of 1994 adopted measures 
significantly strengthened the portfolios of banks, the financial markets remained 
dominated by public institutions (World Bank, 2004). 
 69 
 
One of the main strategies of the Tunisian government was to ensure economic growth, to 
return to export-driven growth and to change the system of incentives. As a part of 
liberalization program and as a condition of ITPAL, the new investment code was 
presented in 1987 to support export promotion which would replace the old insufficient and 
too complex system of incentives (World Bank, 1991).  By the new investment code, the 
government eliminated the need for authorization for all investments except those seeking 
special incentives available to no more than an estimated 25-30% of all new investments 
(World Bank, 1991). All other investments not requesting or not eligible for such incentives 
could be implemented without any prior government approval (World Bank, 1991). The 
new code also improved the transparency and consistency of all incentives available for 
foreign and domestic (World Bank, 1991).  
Privatization of SOEs tended to enhance the productivity of ill-performing PEs being a 
burden on the government budget. However, the process of privatization was not so fast 
and smooth at the beginning when it was initiated in 1987. It only accelerated in 1989 by 
Law no.89-9 and had quite extended process till 2008.  
The highest number of SOEs was in the sectors of transportation, industry, and banking, but 
during the first period, privatizations of hotels, textile companies and smaller holdings were 
ere completed (World Bank, 1989). From the end-1990 to end-1991, the government sold 
US$40 million of its assets in PEs, accounting for less than 0.3% of total assets of PEs as of 
end-1987; at the end of 1991, after four years of privatizations, only about 1% of the assets 
of PEs had been divested (World Bank, 1995). The Stock Exchange was privatized in 
1994(World Bank, 1995).  
From 1987 to 1994 48 SOEs had been privatized and still, a few hundred remained in the 
state's portfolio leaving Tunisia with one of the largest public sectors in the world 
(Guislain, 1997). 
The first phase of SAP was considered quite successful by the World Bank experts as 
liberalization allowed to improve the market environment. One of the significant features of 
the first phase was the decline of government subsidies and expenditures directed to cover 
the budget deficit. The strategies directed to export-led ensure growth. A significant feature 
of the Tunisian export economy was the establishment of the off-shore sector designed to 
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offset the anti-export bias of the protected domestic economy (World Bank, 2004). The 
volume of manufactured exports increased on average by more than 8 % per year and total 
exports by 5 % annually in real terms between 1989 and 1994 (World Bank, 2004). Exports 
of goods and services rose from 30 % of GDP in 1986 to 43% in 1994 (World Bank, 2004).  
In parallel, the rise in unemployment reaching 15 % of the labor force in 1990 was a 
concern urging appropriate measures (World Bank, 2004). 
Despite the progress done in overall macroeconomic environment and trade and price 
liberalization, the implemented policies were incomplete and the steps were required 
toward the continuation of targeted sectors’ improvement. 
 
5.2.3   Continued structural adjustments: 1995–2005  
 
Maintaining sound macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks progress was crucial. 
Tunisian government development number one priority for the next years was to continue 
the structural reforms, gradually opening the economy. The government had still a 
dominant role in the economy and the World Bank and IMF recommendations on export-
oriented reforms were in correspondence to the Development Plans of the government to 
open up the economy to competition while maintaining macroeconomic stability (World 
Bank, 2004).  
The Economic Competitiveness Adjustment Loans (ECAL 1996, 1999, 2001, 2007) aimed 
at accelerating the pace of structural reforms, particularly in the areas of trade 
liberalization, enhancing the enabling environment for investment, opening investment 
activities to the private sector, and reforming the financial sector (World Bank, 2004).  
Though the external debt to GDP ratio improved considerably declining from 58 % in 1995 
to 54 % in 1997, the domestic macroeconomic achievements were less impressive (World 
Bank, 1998). The fiscal deficit improved but the difference was small, at 3.4 % of GDP, in 
1997 over the 1996 level of 4.0 % (World Bank, 1998). The inflation rate fluctuation and 
the projected level proved that there was a space to reduce it further as it remained high. 
The government continued its prudent monetary and fiscal policies. The monetary policy 
aimed to preserve the internal and external value of the TD, by maintaining low inflation 
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and keeping the external balance (World Bank, 2004). Monetary policy was tightened in 
2001, and the Central Bank drastically cut its refinancing to commercial banks to keep 
under control the growth of domestic demand (World Bank, 2004).   
Despite macroeconomic and structural reforms, Tunisia’s growth had relied more on public 
investment, and private investment remained compressed at around 14 % of GDP (World 
Bank, 2004). It was required to continue tariff dismantling policies to develop more 
dynamic and open private sector. In July 1995 Tunisia signed an Association Agreement 
with the European Union (EU) entailing trade liberalization by a gradual phasing out of 
tariffs as a part of trade liberalization and directed into deeper trade integration in the global 
economy (World Bank, 1998). Under the Agreement, tariffs on the import of goods 
(excluding agricultural products) would be progressively eliminated over a 12-year period 
(1996-2007), starting with those on capital and intermediate goods (World Bank, 1998). 
Another negotiation with World Trade Organization ended up with an agreement to 
complete elimination of quantitative import restrictions (mainly on cars) by 2001 (World 
Bank, 1998).  In 1996, the government adopted Finance Law which included a reduction in 
tariffs on equipment (World Bank, 2004). In 2000s Tunisia signed the Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA), the Arab-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement, as well as 
agreements with the European Free Trade Association and the Union du Maghreb Arab and 
various bilateral agreements (AfDB & OECD, 2006).  
Price liberalization remained a priority for the government due to a lot of inconsistencies 
with the strategy aimed to lead Tunisia to the export-led growth economy. Trade protection 
was still high because of high Most Favored Nation tariffs and specifically in 
manufacturing (World Bank, 2004). Most Favored Nation tariffs applied in 2005 were 32 
%, compared to 33 % in 2004 (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 80). At the same time, average 
duties on agricultural products were 67 %, while the average for non-agricultural products 
was 23 % (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 80).  
The reduction in customs duties, as well as other duties and taxes for local products and 
imports, was implemented according to the trade agreements signed by the authorities. In 
2004, a reform of technical inspection procedures for imports was initiated aiming to 
reduce customs clearance times (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 500). Capital accounts 
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liberalization was also applied. In 2005 non-residents were allowed to purchase up to 5% of 
Treasury bonds denominated in foreign currency, exporting companies were allowed to 
make higher level transfers, as well as the right of non-exporting companies was extended 
to make investments abroad to finance their foreign activities (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 
500). 
The efforts were directed to continue rather a slow process of privatization which would 
reduce the state control. In 1998, the privatization of large and profitable companies started. 
The presented agenda of liberalization related to telecommunication sector. However, 
privatization of public monopoly Tunisie Telecom began only in 2002 and extended till 
2008 when the main transaction for the sale of Tunisie Telecom (35% of its shares) took 
place (World Bank Privatization Database, 2015). Ten companies belonging to four fields 
of activity privatized and in 1998 alone, privatization yielded revenue of 435 million TD 
for the budget and balance of payments also greatly benefited from privatization in the form 
of increased FDI (World Bank, 1998). The government could raise its cumulative 
privatization receipts since 1987 from 400 million TD to over 830 million within a year 
(World Bank, 1998). However, the process of privatization declined and in 2005, only four 
companies were privatized bringing in revenues 2.39 billion TD (about €1.43 billion), of 
which 74 % from foreign investors (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 501). 
Private FDI continued to rise in 2002 due to privatizations in telecommunication and banks 
(World Bank, 2004). Under ECAL the largest insurance company (Tunisian Lloyds) was 
privatized and another one (Ellttihad) was restructured (World Bank, 2004).  
Though some improvements made in the banking system, there was still a problem with 
NPLs, the banking system was under control of the government and the issue of 
competitiveness and efficiency of banking sector needed to be addressed. 
At the beginning of 1998, the financial sector of Tunisia consisted of the 13 commercial 
banks and state-controlled banks, eight development banks and eight offshore banks and 
two merchant banks, at the same time the state was controlling three largest banks and more 
than half of the banking system’s assets (World Bank, 2004). According to Tunisian laws, a 
bank is public if the government holds 34% or more of its capital (World Bank, 2004). Four 
commercial banks remained in the public domain (with combined assets that represent 45 
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% of the entire banking system) to serve “strategic” sectors (i.e., agriculture, housing, 
tourism, and micro-credit), development banks mostly had suffered from high levels of 
NPLs and offshore banks provided financial service to enterprises in offshores (World 
Bank, 2004, p. 12). Actions had been taken to reduce NPLs about 19 % of bank assets in 
2001, from over 30 % in 1993, but it again increased to above 22 % since 2002 (World 
Bank, 2004, p.8). Steps undertook to increase tax deductibility of provisions for NPLs, two 
government-controlled banks were privatized, and some private banks were recapitalized 
by owners leading to the financial soundness of a number of banks and significant decline 
of NPLs ration in 2005 (IMF, 2006).  The state-owned banks were still the subject of state 
interference and the banking system had still limited financial freedom. 
As to improvements in the investment environment, FDI reached €488 million in 2004, 
down 5.3% in 2003 and 44 % on 2002 (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 500). Between 2004 and 
2005, Tunisia’s trade deficit decreased from 8.6 to 7.8 % (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 500). 
In 2005, the increase in the value of exports was partly the result of the appreciation of the 
euro (AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 500). Inflation continued to decline and in 2003 it was 2 % 
(World Bank, 2004). The satisfactory results were registered in poverty reduction. The 
incidence of poverty fell from 13 % in 1980-85 to 4 % in 2000 (World Bank, 2004). The 
same positive dynamic could not be registered for unemployment, particularly among the 
youth and external debt level. As Harrigan and El-Said mention, one of the reasons for high 
unemployment rates (15%) was likely to be the extremely rigid labor market legislation 
making it almost impossible to lay off workers (Harrigan & El-Said, 2010). Another reason 
they mention was the low investment levels, despite the registered improvements and the 
wide gap between employment places’ creation in urban as compared to rural areas (El-
Said & Harrigan, 2010). 
External debt level increased from 69.9 % in 2003 to 71.1 % in 2004(AfDB & OECD, 
2006, p. 500). Despite this increase, the debt service coefficient stayed at an acceptable 
level of 14.1 % in 2004, against 13.1 % in 2003(AfDB & OECD, 2006, p. 500). 
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5.2.4 Improvements after 2005 
 
After completion of the main packages of structural adjustment reforms in 2005, the 
loans of World Bank and IMF continued to improve the macroeconomic framework and 
strengthen the implemented structural reforms. Under the fourth Economic 
Competitiveness Development Policy Loan provided by the World Bank, the government 
strengthened the medium fiscal framework. Budget deficit continued to decrease and 
Finance Act of 2007 reduced it to 3.1%, growth reached 5.3 %, but inflation increased from 
2% in 2005 to 4.5% in 2006 mainly due to the significant rise of oil price (World Bank, 
2007, p. 11).  
The private investment climate had been improved for the development of private sector 
and the delays in granting the authorizations were reduced.  
At the revenue level, the 2006 Finance Act included an increase from 25 to 35 % in VAT 
credits for companies and customs duties reduced for a new list of raw materials and capital 
equipment (World Bank, 2007, p. 11). Moreover, the Fiscal law of 2006 re-balanced the 
rate of VATs to 6%, 12% and 18% for the standard rate, addressing the reform of the 
taxation system (World Bank, 2007, p. 11).  
In 2007 the government cut the taxes but the income and corporate tax rates remained quite 
heavy. While tariff dismantling led to a decrease in tariff revenues, any losses were 
compensated for by more burdensome tax rates for onshore companies (BTI, 2010, p.14). 
The government set top income tax rate at 35% and the top corporate tax rate at 30% for 
onshore companies (BTI, 2010, p.14).  
In the banking sector, three state-owned banks controlled 38.7% of total assets, 43.5% of 
loans and 36.5% of total deposits at the end of 2009, hence about one-third of the Tunisian 
banking system (AfDB, 2012). The banking sector was strengthened by increasing the level 
of tax-exempts provisioning to 100% to improve the level of provisioning of NPLs, banks 
with the insufficient level of provisioning were mandated to affect 100% of their benefit to 
improve their provisioning (World Bank, 2007, p. 11). All banks had been required to reach 
a provisioning ratio of 70 % by 2009, up from 46.4 % at end-2005 (IMF, 2006, p. 4). 
Despite this improvements, Tunisian banking system could not improve the performance 
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keeping high levels of NPLs at 13% at the end of 2010, a low provisioning rate at 58% at 
the end of 2010, and low capital adequacy rate at 12.4% (AfDB, 2012). 
The exchange rates and capital accounts were still under the strict control of the Central 
Bank, even though exceptions were accorded to export-related activities (AfDB, 2012). The 
insurance sector was strengthened by restructuring two major insurance companies the 
Societe Tunisienne d’Assurance et de Reassurance (STAR) and le Groupe d’Assurances 
Mutuelles (MGA), thus allowing the foreign investors being majority owners in the capital 
of insurance companies (AfDB, 2012). While the measures applied for the improvement of 
the business environment in offshore sector to develop export-oriented industries and the 
sector was relatively free and competitive, the domestic private sector still was well behind 
with burdensome regulations and controls of the public sector. The public sector dominated 
all the strategic sectors in the economy such as energy, transport, telecommunications, 
pharmacy, collection and trade of basic food, and basic commodities prices were controlled 
by the government as well, not to mention that nine largest firms of the country are SOEs 
(AfDB, 2012).  
Tunisia’s private investment share was still under 60% of total investment and less than 
15% of GDP and especially in the onshore sector, there is a significant gap between rules 
and practices (AfDB, 2012). In parallel, foreign investors were not allowed to have 
majority ownership of Tunisian companies without government approval and domestic 
trading was granted only to Tunisians (nationality and majority of capital) (AfDB, 2012). 
Moreover, foreigners could not own agricultural lands and investments in non-tourism 
onshore companies with a capital share larger than 49% require government authorization 
(BTI, 2010).  
To fix the problem existing between regulations in offshore and onshore fields it was 
necessary to reform the incentives system. In 2007 the government revised the Investment 
code by reducing restrictions to majority capital ownership by foreign investors (World 
Bank, 2004). 
As to privatization processes, the government sold Tunisair in 2006 which allowed to 
generate proceeds from privatization and reduce the budget deficit to 2.1 % of GDP (AfDB 
& OECD, 2006). 
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To ensure macroeconomic stability and liberalize the economy, Tunisia decided to turn to 
the IFIs. SAPs included trade and price liberalization, privatization of SOEs, financial 
sector reforms, taxation, devaluation of the national currency and restrictive monetary 
policy. Neoliberal package of reforms considered successfully implemented in Tunisia, 
nevertheless, recorded a lot of shortcomings. While reforms in Tunisia’s foreign trade 
regime supported to the liberalization and to the process of dismantling trade barriers in 
2008 as a result of an agreement with the EU, but foreign trade regime was still heavily 
regulated, public sector dominance over private sector was tremendous not mentioning the 
problems related to corruption and transparency. Pricing was almost free except the cases 
when the state can set prices for subsidized commodities and influence on prices through 
regulation and state-owned utilities and enterprises and monopolies (BTI, 2010). In general, 
Tunisian authorities were reluctant to follow the recommendations regarding monopolies 
and prices subject to monopoly enterprises of products remained unchanged. 
In the financial sector, despite the reforms, the banking sector and capital market were still 
considered heavily regulated, and financial regulations had political influence as elite had 
direct control. Although the state sold its stakes in two banks in 2002 and 2005, 
respectively, the country remained the controlling shareholder in at least four other banks 
with 50% of their assets (BTI, 2010, p. 16). The interference of the state was presented in 
direct control of financial flows, as well as with the presence of elites’ representatives in 
top positions of banks’ regulating bodies.  
Neoliberal reform of foreign investment remained restrictive with the required approval 
which allowed tightly regulating the capital flows. The slow process of privatization 
directed to reduce the state control was much rooted in a bad organization of the divestiture.  
Here again, World Bank and IMF promoted a neoliberal model of development putting the 
accent on economic growth which would eventually combat increased unemployment and 
poverty.  
In parallel with the liberalization of the economy, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's seizure of 
power in November 1987 was a signal that more pluralistic political system would be 
developed in Tunisia (BTI, 2010). As such, since 1999 Tunisia hold, in formal terms, 
pluralistic presidential elections, following with Constitutional amendments made in 2002 
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which allowed the President in coming presidential elections of 2004 and 2009 to run for a 
fourth and fifth mandate  (BTI, 2010). The President could adopt his power based on the 
ruling party and the opposition parties that could resist were banned and even legalized 
opposition parties did not influence ruling party. All branches of power were under the 
direct executive control of the President.  
Hence significant transformation shortcomings and resistance in liberalization process of 
the economy and the continued state interference and control of economy were also the 
reflections of the autocratic political reality of Tunisia. The political turmoil of 2010 
leading to the revolution ended up with the resignation of Ben Ali.  
Despite the improvements in liberalization policies, high unemployment rate, poor living 
conditions, widespread corruption and lack of political freedoms reflected in the struggle 
for political regime change. 
 
 5.3 Results of Neoliberal policies in Tunisia and Morocco 
 
The package of Washington Consensus policies in the form of the structural reforms 
aimed to decrease the role of state intervention in the economy and diminish protectionist 
policies in various sectors of the economy. The comprehensive package of Washington 
Consensus principles with harsh methods imposed on Morocco and Tunisia to overcome 
the critical crisis. The institutionalization of neoliberalism by IFIs and the promotion of 
Washington Consensus agenda with a focus on the importance of SAPs are considered as a 
backbone for developing countries. Neoliberalism which turned to emerge as a useful tool 
to reduce state control on the economy and to ensure economic efficiency, on the contrary, 
became merely an instrument in the hands of the World Bank and IFM to rapidly transform 
Morocco and Tunisia into the models of growth. Growth promoted by World Bank and 
IMF was considered as an essential element for market-oriented economy and the imposed 
SAPs were implemented in the context of development. As Stiglitz (2002, 2008) 
emphasizes the concept of growth for developing countries has been summarized as 
liberalization, stabilization and privatization (as cited in Babb, 2013, p. 270). SAPs had 
been developed within these three pillars and promoted as merely an economic agenda and 
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imposed by World Bank as a universalistic approach without accounting the particularities 
of the countries. Rapid transformation into the models of growth turned to be the prolonged 
implementation of deep structural reforms. Washington Consensus agenda dogmatically 
promoted the prescriptions whereas the governments in Morocco and Tunisia could not find 
the balance between the concept of withdrawal of state from the market and its capacities 
for the institutional development of the markets.  
Morocco and Tunisia, as one of the client countries, became a laboratory for the 
implementation of economic policies promoting theory of neoliberalism intertwined with 
Washington Consensus policy instruments. The theory, which favors a reduced role of the 
state in the market, but as a development prescription institutionalized by IFIs, pushed 
forward a set of conditions on client countries to receive international assistance. In case of 
Morocco and Tunisia, these prescriptions in the form of SAPs transformed the ideological 
and political background of neoliberalism to severe neoliberal model for development. The 
imposed aggressive neoliberal policies had been implemented ignoring the political and 
institutional context of the both client countries. IMF and World Bank’s SAPs enforced 
“free market fundamentalism” neglecting the weak institutional capacity and the presence 
of autocratic regimes. The applied severe neoliberal model in Morocco and Tunisia was not 
just the rejection of the previous economic model but rather a “dogmatic laissez-faire 
attitude” without ensuring the framework within which the competitive market could 
flourish. According to the World Bank reports the results of the macroeconomic measures 
and structural reforms were assessed as sufficient in the context of enhancing the business 
environment and improving the competitiveness of the economy. However, 
neoliberalization in Morocco and Tunisia has not been very effective in regard to the 
market consistencies. The problems of establishment of effective markets also were 
conditioned with approaches of structural reforms’ speed of implementation recommended 
by the World Bank. The chosen approaches to adjustment mostly conditioned by the deep 
destabilized financial and economic situation in Morocco. The applied faster 
macroeconomic stabilization policies and gradual implementation of other structural 
reforms created a distortion. Tunisia started a more liberal approach to the economy and 
adopted a premarket strategy of liberalization earlier than Morocco. Adhered to gradual 
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approach of reform implementation, Tunisia was much quicker to adjust to the new 
environment due to also its mixed economy character in the 1970s encouraging FDI. Both 
countries’ economies characterized by strong state domination and interventionism but their 
starting points of economic development were diverse to some extent. Morocco and Tunisia 
could gain relatively macroeconomic stabilized environment, but the reforms, considered to 
adjust the economic structure of the countries, were propagated by IFIs as the main panacea 
to ensure growth. The strategy to increase growth and keep inflation under control, 
transformed neoliberal reforms implementation into a “checklist” by authorities inducing 
opposition entirely to follow the forced recommendations. The resistance showed up 
specifically in sectors where the state was reluctant to follow the policies directed on 
reducing the central control on decision-making. 
Morocco and Tunisia required setting an economic agenda that would promote not just the 
withdrawal of the state from the market but to help in the separation of the economic power 
from the political influence.  
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6. Roots and Evolution of crony capitalism  
 
  6.1 Morocco 
 
The political history of Morocco is characterized by the authoritative rule of the King 
and his centralized use of power (Biygautane & Lahouel, 2011). Though it is a 
“constitutional monarchy,” the King’s supreme power gives another picture of political 
reality in Morocco. He is the head of the state and the Supreme Representative of the 
Nation, he appoints the Cabinet members, the Prime Minister, and has the authority to 
dismiss them and even can dissolve the legislature on his initiative (Biygautane & Lahouel, 
2011, p. 6). Despite the existence of a bicameral Parliament, the real decision maker is the 
King and the government approves whatever decisions are made by the King (Biygautane 
& Lahouel, 2011). Desrues and Moyano state that while the Kingdom has a multi-party 
system, the political parties are marginalized which allowed King Hassan II (1961–99) to 
be the only supreme representative of the nation, as well as he monopolized relations 
between the different interest groups in Moroccan society (Desrues & Moyano, 2001). 
During decolonization from French protectorate, the King’s makhzen (royal household) 
could acquire settler property and distribute it to its strategic clients (Cammett, 2007). Saadi 
considers that a “critical juncture” in the making of Moroccan crony capitalism was 
“Moroccanization.”(Saadi, 2016). The King took over some richest lands and became one 
of the largest landowners and with nationalization “Morocconization” of industrial and 
commercial properties in 1973, most of the enterprises went to the groups of private 
entrepreneurs who were the part of makhzen (Cammett, 2007).   
Proclaiming nationalization allowed officially transfer the majority ownership of French-
owned companies to Moroccan business groups and a preferential treatment enabled the 
economic elite to strengthen its assets through its closeness to the makhzen (Biygautane & 
Lahouel, 2011). 
Moroccan King became a central actor in the process of Morocconization when he took 
over important foreign companies, particularly the French group called “Omnium Nord-
Africain” (ONA) and Unigral Cristal (Saadi, 2016). Specifically, financial sector shows the 
domination of Moroccan private elites, as the control of main banking companies provides 
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with a considerable profit and economic influence. Other important holding families 
perform the same strategy, such as Lamrani family (SAFARI-SOFIPAR group) with close 
ties with makhzen (Oubenal, 2016).  
The initiated neoliberal reforms aimed to reduce the strong role of the state and eradicate 
the existing system of cronyism and in this context, it is essential to understand the way 
privatization was processed which can be very useful to explain whether the network of 
makhzen was extended or not. As a neoliberal policy and in the framework of Washington 
Consensus, privatization is considered to lessen the pressure on the government budget, as 
well as private industry is managed more efficiently than SOEs. Moreover, at the same 
time, it has also the objective to stimulate the participation of middle-income population 
which will also help to extend property ownership (Kim, 2005).  
Under the SAL I Agreement Morocco obliged to implement the first phase of privatization. 
Though King Hassan announced about the necessity of privatization in 1986, the process 
began only in 1993. Morocco’s Privatization Law 39-89 presented the list of 112 SOEs 
(later increased to 114) to be privatized (World Bank, 1995). The target enterprises should 
meet the particular criteria including (actually or potentially) profitable operations, the 
absence of serious overstaffing, no public service responsibilities, a significant share of 
state ownership, and a role in regional development (World Bank, 1995). Najem 
emphasizes that the criteria established by the authorities regarding identifying preferred 
buyers tended to favor the traditional Moroccan elites (Najem, 2001, p. 63). 37 of the 
companies on the original list were hotels, 43 manufacturing enterprises, four main banks, 
insurance companies, finance companies and service companies, as well as big industrial 
businesses (particularly in the cement, steel, petrol, phosphate and mining sectors), in the 
area of public services such as post and telecommunications, transport, state-owned water 
and electricity companies (World Bank, 1995). The Law specified method of sale for 
Moroccan companies. The companies to be privatized by initial public offering on the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange could be acquired through direct negotiations if the potential 
buyer demonstrated that he was the most logical potential purchaser and the existing 
majority shareholder (World Bank, 1995, Ernst, Edwards, Gladstone, Gregory, & Holt. 
1999). Employees might also be permitted to buy up to 10% of the share capital of the 
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company, or 20% of the State holding (World Bank, 1995, Ernst et al., 1999). The principal 
methods of privatization through competitive bidding are the sale of assets or shares 
through public auction or tender, and the public offering of shares through a stock exchange 
(World Bank, n.d., p.7). According to legal guidelines of the World Bank "except in the 
case of pre-existing contractual rights such as pre-emptive options to purchase held by 
existing private shareholders, a direct negotiated sale to a single buyer should be avoided" 
(World Bank, n.d., p.7). Hence, it is desirable to use the public auction or tender and public 
offering through the stock exchange than the direct sale (private contract) for privatization 
which is a conventional method but due to its complexity and lack of means ensure proper 
transparency may be considered a source of corruption, specifically in transition 
economies.  
Most of the companies had been presented for privatization through first bidding but then 
purchased by direct sale (World Bank Privatization Database, 2015). According to Najem 
(2001) “the favored type of divestiture tended to involve at least a partial sale of a given 
privatizable asset to a noyau dur (or hardcore) of investors before it was listed on the stock 
market. These cores of investors tend to be comprised of elements with strong links to the 
regime.”(p. 61). Hence, in that case, a hardcore of investors would prefer the sale of 
companies through direct negotiations allowing generating more revenue instead through 
open tender or the stock market. So, giving preference to noyau dur form, we conclude that 
the regime tended to use the privatization program to continue its traditional tactics to 
secure and extend the cronyistic links within the elite by linking it with the private sector. 
The choice of noyau dur complicated the situation with transparency which is crucial in 
case of privatization as in case of sale on the stock market the concerns regarding 
transparency will not be debated during the bidding process. As Mansouri et al. (2005) 
mentioned “the ‘cake’ of privatization seems to be mainly profitable for the bigger local 
and foreign capital” (p. 34). Employees’ participation and acquisition of shares in the 
bidding process was not tangible, as according to Privatization Law allocation of shares to 
employees was not considerable. Moreover, average Moroccan employees, including the 
middle-income population did not have enough income to acquire a large number of shares. 
Whereas as Najem mentions the traditional economic elites were the only who could have 
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the capital to offer for shares in state holdings (Najem, 2001). Thus, the objective of 
privatization to bring the middle-income population into the privatization process and in 
that way to help to extend property ownership to broader segments of the society could be 
considered as failed. 
As a part of the privatization program, foreign investors were invited to bid as strategic 
investors (part of the noyau dur) (Ernst et al., 1999). The participation of foreign investors 
was significant as a part of the liberalization implemented in FDI under SAL I in 1983 and 
1988 and Sectoral Adjustment agricultural loan, and the acquired share of assets by foreign 
investors was registered as a significant step forward, but Moroccan companies or 
individuals purchased the majority of companies. The data shows that by the end of 1994, 
based on the initial privatization list, the privatization transactions registered from the 
following countries: Morocco 62.7%, Switzerland 11.9 %, UK 8.5 %, France 8.7 %, USA 
4.2 %, Others 4.0% (World, 1995, p.12).  
If we consider that one of the primary objectives of the privatization was the reduction of 
budget expenditure by selling loss-making companies, the list of the companies for 
privatization must be composed of these companies. But the Table 1 below shows that 
according to the audit implemented by the World Bank, the giant companies with the 
negative profile (net profits) or with less profit were not on the privatization list. We based 
on the World Bank report on the summary of the data available on significant PEs. 
        
Table 1. Data on major public enterprises 
Public enterprise name     Year   State share   Net profits (million) 
 
ONE 1994 100 -819  
ONEP  1994 100 -81 
ONCF 1994 100 -744 
ONPT  1994 100 209 
ONDA  1992 100 -124 
RAM  1994 93,82 101 
COMANAV  1994 68,62 4,4 
ODEP 1994 100 30,5 
BRPM 1994 100 -0,2 
Source: World Bank Privatization, 2015 and Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, 2010 
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Though these are only the part of massive PE because of the lack of data, it shows that the 
companies have not been included on the initial list for the privatization. Undoubtedly there 
can be various explanations why the government did not present first the loss-making PE 
for privatization. Najem states that the logic behind is the difficulty in selling loss-making 
companies but the regime was also concerned with using the sell-offs as a form of 
patronage to secure and extend their already strong links with the Moroccan private sector 
elements that were most likely have both the interest and the capital to buy into the 
traditionally state-run industries (Najem, 2001, p. 59). Thus, on the initial list, a lot of 
companies were among the profitable ones. Another indicative was the sale of two largest 
companies ICOZ and SIMEF to Moroccan-International Consortium at a meager price (1.2 
$ million, 10 million in MDH), through the direct sale with share of 97,44% (World Bank 
Privatization Database, 2015).  
Catusse emphasizes that based on examination of privatization operations it is obvious that 
just a few groups were regularly presented during offers and purchase of the companies 
(Catusse, 2009, p.9).  
When presenting the roots of cronyism in Morocco, we referred to several groups of 
Moroccan private elites that dominated in the financial sector during Morocconization. 
Catusse discusses the case of Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), the private holdings of the 
royal family, which became the principal national winner from the privatization (Catusse, 
2009, p.9).  
During the second phase of privatization launched under the SAL II covering broad specter 
of state enterprises in various economic sectors, Group ONA purchased the enterprises in 
mining mostly through direct sale (World Bank Privatization Database, 2015). As Catusse 
mentions, for ONA it was the occasion to deploy a “multi-sectoral strategy” (Catusse, 2009, 
p.10). In their works, Catusse and Denoux mention that the royal family is the primary 
shareholder in Morocco's largest private conglomerate, ONA-SNI (Catusse, 2009, Denoux, 
2007). In the privatization dataset of the World Bank Database, the Group ONA listed as 
the purchaser of SNI (Societe Nationale d'Investissement) a public holding with large 
stakes in manufacturing, mining, commerce, and services and sugar production as well 
(World Bank Privatization Database, 2015).  
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Already in 1994 and 1995 with the help of FMDL, the privatization was also implemented 
regarding the financial sector and ten financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, 
and a large financial holding) were privatized (World Bank, 1995, p. 7). ONA-SNI 
conglomerate, behind the name of the Consortium of Moroccan financial institutions, 
privatized a lot of enterprises not only in mining but also banking sector, insurance, real 
estate, agribusiness, and communication. The King Mohammed VI of Morocco inherited a 
35% stake in SNI (formerly ONA-SNI, formerly ONA) and significantly developed it 
(Lhomme, Benchemsi & Davet, 2016). Since then it is the ruling family’s main source of 
wealth controlling, often with majority shares, 34 companies, and covering a dozen major 
economic sectors with stakes in the country's largest bank, Attijariwafa, mining company 
Managem Group, sugar producer Cosumar, and dairy firm Centrale Danone (Lhomme, 
Benchemsi & Davet, 2016). Oubenal emphasizes that the control of financial sector, mainly 
banking companies by the monarchy and its surrounding were conditioned by the fact that 
it was a very profitable sector and during the 2000s the value-added of financial activities 
was higher than industrial sectors as well as the concentration of capital specifically of bank 
companies was also significant (Oubenal, 2016). He refers to the listed three main banks on 
Casablanca Stock Exchange (Attijariwafa bank, BCP and BMCE Bank) with the 
concentration around 65% of assets, deposits, and loans (Oubenal, 2016, p.6). Catusse 
notes that together with a few other big groups (Benjelloun family, Kettani, Akhannouch, 
etc.), this conglomerate “reinforce their acquired positions and diversify in all directions” 
(Catusse, 2009, p.10). Benjelloun family is the owner of BMCE Bank which is one of 
Morocco’s largest banks and has activities in more than 15 African countries, not 
mentioning that through his company FinanceCom, Othman Benjelloun, the 81-year-old 
businessman, has investments in banking, insurance, and telecom in Morocco (Allilou, 
2014). It should be mentioned the name of Moulay Hafid Elalamy as a political figure to 
understand the interconnection between various big groups regarding business and their 
position. He owns an estimated 83% of Saham Group, which operates CNIA Saada, one of 
Morocco's biggest insurance companies (Salako, 2015). In June 2015, Moulay Hafid 
Elalamy formed a joint venture with FinanceCom, owned by another Moroccan billionaire 
Othman Benjelloun, to broaden the insurance and other financial products market 
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throughout Africa (Salako, 2015). At the same time, Elalamy also had occupied the position 
of Secretary General of the group, and General Manager of the insurance subsidiary 
(Ministry of Industry, Investment, Trade and Digital Economy, n.d.). At present, he is 
Morocco's Minister of Industry and Commerce (Ministry of Industry, Investment, Trade 
and Digital Economy, n.d.). 
Aziz Akhannouch is one of the representatives of the families in this big group of business. 
He has stakes in Akwa Group, a multi-billion-dollar Moroccan conglomerate with interests 
in petroleum, gas, and chemicals through its publicly-traded subsidiaries Afriquia Gas and 
Maghreb Oxygene, as well as in media, real estate development and hotels (Allilou, 2014). 
In parallel, he is also the Minister of Agriculture and Marine Fishing, as well as 
administrator of BMCE-Bank (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, n.d.).  
According to Oubenal, Lamrani family (SAFARI-SOFIPAR group) became a shareholder 
in different commercial and industrial companies and the principal shareholder of the bank 
Credit du Maroc (Oubenal, 2016). In general, Lamrani family’s economic extraction and 
linkage with political power can be traced during Moroconnization period when the Prime 
Minister of 12th and 13th governments of Morocco was Mohamed Karim Lamrani, 
(August 6, 1971) (12 April 1972) (Ministry of Culture and Communication of Morocco, 
n.d.). Lamrani was the Prime Minister of during 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d governments 
implementing SAPs and during the privatization as well (Ministry of Culture and 
Communication of Morocco, n.d.). 
We already discussed the deal type of privatization and that the majority of deals were 
conducted through direct negotiations. However, we assume that it cannot be the only 
indicator that elites and groups who already held concentrations of considerable capital 
used this deal type to reinforce the economic power. It should be mentioned that the 
bidding process regarding the financial sector and specifically banks and insurance 
companies were also implemented through tender or public offering in the stock market 
(World Bank Database, 2015; Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, 2010). But the purchaser of companies in the banking sector and insurance was 
predominantly Consortium d'institutions financières marocaines which also was the buyer 
of SNI as a part of Group ONA conglomerate.  
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Though the process of privatization boosted foreign investment participation, it is 
noteworthy to mention that before SAPs the Moroccan elites had been implementing the 
restrictive policies of foreign ownership of certain economic sectors which was mostly 
conditioned with the reduction of the French businesses dominant role in the Moroccan 
economy. During the 1990s, under FMDL directed to address FDI as a neoliberal policy, 
the new investment code was adopted in 1995 tending to improve the investment conditions 
and promoting FDI flows (World Bank, 1995). Morocco reduced the level of restrictions. 
However, the investment code prohibits foreigners to have ownerships predominantly in the 
agricultural sector, monopolies on phosphate and applies discretionary right to limit all 
foreign majority stakes in the capital of large national banks (World Bank, 1995). Investing 
Across Borders indicators measuring FDI regulation show that despite the banking system 
is quite competitive, there are limits on foreign capital stakes in the large established banks. 
Moroccan central bank (Bank Al Maghrib) may use regulatory discretion in issuing 
authorization for the establishment of domestic and foreign-owned banks as well (Bureau 
of Economic and Business Affairs, 2017).   
Regardless of the liberalization reforms, the case of privatization was likely to serve as a 
mechanism for the influential families to keep their domination in the spheres where they 
have control and ensure the influence of monarchy over the multiple essential sectors of the 
Kingdom. If market-oriented neoliberal policies directed to lessen the role of the state and 
to abstain from using the political control to intervene in market regulations, in case of 
Morocco, we can see that cronies not to lose the real advantages, tried to use the reforms to 
protect their interests and to consolidate their economic power. Moroccan regime could 
channel the privatization in a way benefiting the elites which was also conditioned with the 
fact that other stakeholders did not possess enough financial resources to privatize the 
enterprises and in this context the royal family and closest surrounding reinforced its 
economic positions almost in all sectors of the economy. We provided here with the 
process of privatization to show that even with the determined objectives of the market-
oriented policies, the elites tried to serve the reform for redistribution of the economic 
power and enlarge the existing ties between state and small interest groups. The state 
interventionism though reduced but was still strong enough to grant economic opportunities 
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to the higher echelon of the elite who used privatization in the process of restructuring of 
power to institutionalize cronyism. Hence, the interpersonal and cultural phenomena of 
cronyism developed into the systematic and structural feature: crony capitalism. 
 
 6.2   Tunisia 
 
Tunisia is a unitary semi-presidential representative country which after gaining the 
independent from France was ruled by the President Bourguiba leading the state to a highly 
centralized system of governance and authoritarianism (Biygautane and Lahouel, 2011). In 
1987, Zine Abidin Bin Ali, a military figure overthrown Bourguiba in a coup, initially 
paving the way for democracy, but he could consolidate the power and became more 
repressive head of state than Bourguiba (Biygautane and Lahouel, 2011). The Parliament 
was one of the weakest institutions in the political system of the country and though the 
opposition had seats in the Parliament the decision making was monopolized by the 
President (Biygautane and Lahouel, 2011). The centralized form of the political structure of 
Tunisia had its influence on the economic orientation of the country. State interventionism 
was practicing as a model since decolonization when French private companies transferred 
to the state. As Pfeifer states, under Bourguiba, the state took control of natural sources, 
notably phosphates and hydrocarbons, finance and banking (Pfeifer 1999). Under 
Bourguiba, the preferential treatment was a common practice specifically for clans coming 
from regions which doubled the wealth at the expense of other parts of the country. It 
indicates that Tunisia’ regions developed disproportionally as business clans ran the most 
privileged ones. Moreover, Bourguiba's government inherited and acquired facilities of the 
infrastructure like transportation, railways, ports, telecommunications, and banking 
(Biygautane and Lahouel, 2011). Cammett (2007) indicates that “unlike in Morocco, where 
the big groups had stakes throughout the economy, Tunisian business owners tended to 
confine their holdings to a single sector, focusing either on manufacturing, banking, or 
mining”(p. 77).  
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With neoliberal economic reforms introduced during the 1980s and 1990s, the level state 
interventionism should be reduced and in this context, the use of privatization methods 
applied in Tunisia will be helpful understand what the dynamics in Tunisia were.  
Tunisia obliged to reform its vast public sector and launched its privatization reform under 
Public enterprises restructuring Loan (PERL) which was the part of single SAL lasting 
from 1987-1991. The mission of PERL was to improve management and competitiveness 
of PEs, support private sector development through privatization and support the 
financial/technical recovery of certain enterprises in need (World Bank, 1995). Law 87-47 
was the first document proclaiming to restructure the public sector in 1987 and to create a 
commission which would decide on the list of enterprises to be privatized. However, the 
process of organization and implementation of privatization was a complicated one in 
Tunisia because Tunisian executive body had unlimited power and leverage to keep away 
from the active participation of other stakeholders in the policy-making process of 
privatization.  
According to Belev even the word ‘privatization,’ was rarely mentioned and instead, the 
‘participation in public enterprises’ and ‘restructuring’ phrasing was mentioned not to 
involve the potential stakeholders in the process (Belev, 2001).  However, the organization 
of privatization process extended with similar arrangements in 1989 in the framework of 
public sector reform under PERL aiming to entirely or partially liquidate state-owned 
companies or transfer the responsibilities to non-state shareholders.  
Only in 1994 with Law 94-102, the scope of the framework was defined including the 
intention to privatize also banks and insurance companies. ECAL of 1996 aimed at 
accelerating the pace of structural reforms and privatization of large companies as a part of 
conditionality continued in 1998, particularly the large and profitable companies in 
telecommunication and banks. Between 1997 and 2003, ten companies belonging to four 
fields of activity were privatized (World Bank, 1999). In comparison with Morocco, the 
peculiarity of Tunisian government during the process of privatization was the absence of 
particular plans and the exact list of enterprises targeted for divestiture. In comparison with 
Morocco, where the target enterprises should meet the defined criteria regarding identifying 
preferred buyers, Tunisian Decree on Privatization had set only the general concepts and 
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listed the bodies responsible in the process of privatization.  The selection criteria, 
regulations, and scope of methods to be used for privatization were not included in Law, 
only the list of public companies that must not be privatized, such as strategic ones (Sagir, 
1993). Even the World Bank’s Privatization database does not sufficiently provide the list 
of targeted enterprises, sector and deal types of privatization due to the lack of information 
from the state authorities. We assume that the designed Law allowed the corresponding 
state agencies in charge of privatization to maneuver on open space with unlimited 
discretion. Belev considers that regarding the privatization the government permitted the 
information in only one way, from the top down, and little feedback was asked for (Belev, 
2001). Belev emphasizes that while initially it was decided to privatize the loss-making 
enterprises, the situation had been changed already in 1994 when it was extended to profit-
making enterprises and even the ones considered being strategic ones (Belev, 2001).  
On the contrary to Morocco, among the multiple methods of privatization with the level of 
state involvement in the process of implementation, Tunisia mostly adhered to the 
privatization through the sale of assets or shares through public auction or tender, and the 
initial public offering of shares through a stock exchange selling. Though there were the 
cases when the enterprises privatized through direct negotiations or distribution of vouchers 
and applying liquidation or merger for several loss-making enterprises, predominantly the 
government chose the mentioned methods as a basis for competitive bidding. Moreover, the 
government declared that the employees of SOEs would have given the priority in 
acquiring shares in the enterprises. Belev notes that the government could reduce potential 
opposition from labor providing priority to employees and also facilitated to apply the 
methods of divestiture which would limit the number of players involved in the transactions 
(Belev, 2001).   
By using the strategy of selling shares on the Tunisian Stock exchange the ruling elite tried 
to broaden its ownership through privatization. The problem was that those deals related to 
the small investor transactions. The Tunis Bourse set the standards for companies which 
many of the listed ones could not meet. The government also used “a golden share “concept 
regarding the privatization of several sensitive companies which allow to veto and keep 
control rights over the company to be privatized, including the sale of one or more assets 
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(Belev, 2001). Marquardt and Clark (1994) mention that the “Golden Share was never a 
real shareholding but rather a protectionist legal facility that gave the government added 
control over the eventual ownership of its newly privatized companies”(p. 417). 
The portfolio of the Tunisian public sector was quite extensive. Though the real wave of 
privatization started in 1995, since 1988 the government tried to sell the companies in the 
service sector and some agricultural enterprises. The deal type of these transactions is not 
indicated in the World Bank Privatization dataset, and only the transactions of enterprises 
since 1995 are noted in the database. So far, the majority of these transactions have been 
carried out through a sale of assets to strategic investors (World Bank Database, 2015). 
Here, again we face the problem that Najem raised regarding privatization process in 
Morocco having the similarities in Tunisia privatization program. The choice of strategic 
investor or a hardcore (a noyau dur) could shed lights on the transparent process of 
privatization. Belev indicates ‘spin-off’ (cession) or ‘merger’ (fusion) was used to cover 
sale of a part or an entire enterprise to a strategic investor (Belev, 2001). 
Under ECAL of 2007, the government obliged to revise the Investment code in 2007 by 
reducing restrictions to majority capital ownership by foreign investors (World Bank, 
2007). The new Investment code allowed foreign investors to participate in privatization 
and to purchase Tunisian companies. However, most of the enterprises were sold to 
Tunisians.  
The reforms implemented must support the reduction of control of central government, but 
in the context of privatization, the government behaved the opposite way utterly. 
Privatization cannot be transparent and to coincide with its stated objectives if the 
government does not ensure active participation of other stakeholders, such as public sector 
managers, private sector investors and unions in the process of privatization. Starting from 
the declaration about PE restructuring and later vague interpretation of the corresponding 
Law and limiting the debate around the privatization program were the signals that the state 
control over the process of privatization would likely be implemented in a protectionism 
way of the essential sectors. The small private sector was still under the process of 
development and had no sufficient financial resources to acquire shares. Another problem 
was that business environment was unable to operate without the support of the public 
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sector and the subsidies provided by the state. At the same time, big enterprises were 
mostly controlling the key sectors of the economy. This reality created the inability for the 
small private sector to be fully participating in the privatization. Pfeifer mentions that many 
big enterprises were owned by the elite which increased the probability of protectionism 
and unfair competition and the possibility of the unequal distribution of benefits of the 
market-oriented reform process (Pfeifer, 1999). If one of the main points of privatization is 
the abolition of state monopoly, in Tunisia it turned to be a private monopoly and the state 
mechanism was used to secure it, thus limiting the competition and consolidating the 
economic power. Cammett (2007) emphasizes that “prominent families – usually those 
with close connections to Ben Ali and his family – expanded their holdings significantly 
across diverse sectors” (p. 78). Among the examples was the won a public auction in 2000 
by Marouane Mabrouk, one of Mr. Ben Ali's sons-in-law, to acquire a controlling stake in 
Le Moteur, a state company that distributes Mercedes cars in Tunisia (Gauthier-Villars, 
2011). He also won a government license to set up Tunisia's first broadband-cellphone 
network (Gauthier-Villars, 2011). 
Another example of the widened network of cronies is Sakher El Materi business activity, 
the other son-in-law of Ben Ali who controlled the Princess Holding of Tunisia, the largest 
conglomerate in Tunisia which held various companies in the industry sector 
(Wigglesworth, England & Parker, 2016). He first made money by investing in and 
reselling companies that were being privatized (Gauthier-Villars, 2011). In 2006, he bought 
a 41% stake from state-controlled Banque Nationale Agricole SA for 3.6 million TD, in the 
Tunisian unit of Swiss food group Nestlé SA by using some of the proceeds (Gauthier-
Villars, 2011). 
Mr. El Materi founded a Bank Zeytouna, Tunisia's first Islamic Bank, bought a 25% stake 
in Tunisia's second-largest telecom operator, got elected to parliament and acquired a media 
group, Radio Zitouna (“Banque Zitouna - Tunisia Opens,” 2010; Gauthier-Villars, 2011). 
It is only the top of the iceberg of crony capitalism network cherished and promoted by Ben 
Ali. The system of privileges and network of cronies is not a new phenomenon in Tunisia, 
as it has already functioned during French Protectorate and enlarged after independence. 
Nevertheless, with the launch of a privatization program, it expanded with new wave within 
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the frames of neoliberal reforms. Cammett argues that notable shifts took place in a system 
renowned for crony capitalist ties between the state and small elite that controls vast 
holdings across the multiple sectors of the economy (Cammett, 2007, p. 6). As Freund et al. 
emphasize interventionism became increasingly directed by the country’s elite for their 
benefit (Freund et al., 2014). After the revolution, when Ben Ali had to flee Tunisia, the 
new government issued a Declaration listing the names of Ben Ali and his wife family links 
that owned hundreds of companies. The network of cronies from Ben Ali and Trabelsi 
family counted 112 people subjected to international prosecution and their companies were 
confiscation with the assets freeze abroad (Décret-Loi n° 2011-13). In the context of 
privatization, the President and his family could group close associates expanding their 
crony activities which allowed them not only to survive but also to develop their firms’ 
opportunities using state intervention policies regarding competition. The non-democratic 
nature of the regime promoted the potential development of cronyism making it structural.  
What differentiates Tunisia from Morocco in the context of privatization is that the 
privatization process was faster, deeper and more transparent concerning openness of 
information published about privatization. In Tunisia, it had the more decentralized picture, 
with creation and cancelation of various committees responsible for privatization which 
also influenced on the organizational structure of privatization. If Morocco, since SAPs, 
had already big economic groups with stakes throughout the whole economy, the 
peculiarity of the Tunisian business groups was the concentration on the single sector. As 
Cammett mentions, the elite could expand its holdings across diverse sectors (Cammett, 
2007). If privatization in Morocco was not a challenge for makhzen as the sectors were 
already distributed and based on strong ties between the King and elites, in Tunisia the 
redistribution of assets and the necessary enlargement of cronyism required rearrangement 
of the economic domain between the groups which came to power with Ben Ali. Moreover, 
makhzen as a mode of controlling the economy had strong roots and the interest groups 
used the process of reforms to turn into reality their economic objectives through political 
control of the Monarchy. 
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 6.3 Concluding results on crony capitalism 
 
According to the neoliberal principles, the reduction of big government involvement in 
the economy was considered to be the most effective way of controlling cronyism. The 
neoliberal reforms package is linked with idea promoted by World Bank and the IMF on 
combat of corruption. According to World Bank (1997) "economic policy reform should be 
the main pillar of anticorruption strategy” and “deregulation and the expansion of markets 
are powerful tools for controlling corruption and promoting economic growth" (World 
Bank, 1997, p. 35). So, the market tools must decrease the level of corruption. Among other 
main neoliberal objectives, Williamson envisaged the Washington Consensus, as the 
opportunity to minimize the potential for corruption. In this study, we departed from the 
idea that under non-democratic regimes neoliberal policies will likely support the evolution 
of crony capitalism. 
Examining the Tunisian and Moroccan path to market economy, in the context of the 
relationship of the implemented neoliberal reforms and the evolution of crony capitalism 
we can conclude that “laissez-faire” in Morocco and Tunisia had been performed without 
the robust institutional framework which would ensure the fair competitive market allowing 
the cronies support state interventions mechanism for their benefits.  
In our analysis of the relationship between neoliberal policies and crony capitalism, we 
based first of all on examination of roots of cronyism before the reform period, and we 
found that deep roots of business-state relations and well-developed network of cronies was 
an inherent part of both countries. Morocco’s elite was consolidated around makhzen and 
the Monarchy’s business relations with economic groups were the inherited practice since 
French protectorate. Moreover, business interests were introduced directly in the 
government and high officials of the government were represented in big enterprises. 
Tunisia’s cronyistic roots were in the practice of the preferential treatment specifically for 
clans coming from regions. The strong executive power of the President institute helped the 
new President who came to power with strong business groups to consolidate economic 
power around him and his family. 
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Detecting the privatization as a mechanism, we traced and analyzed the openness of process 
and the applied methods of privatization. Privatization of enterprises was not a mere 
process of transferring the SOEs to the private sector. Analysis of the process showed that 
in both states the delegation of power and the issue of accountability was a matter of 
question. Based on the study of the Laws, we found that the issue of accountability and 
transparency was a challenge and the governments were reluctant to ensure regulatory 
oversight and audit. The specific political and institutional settings were not appropriately 
organized to provide the flow of operations transparently.  
Examining the process of privatization of Tunisia, we found that the government did not 
have the particular plan and the list of enterprises for privatizations, as well as certain 
criteria concerning identifying preferred buyers, regulations, and scope of methods to be 
used for privatization were lacking in the law. Even the process of privatization was called 
the process of restructuring of SOEs. Mainly, we found that the government did not ensure 
active participation of other stakeholders in the process of privatization.  
Examining the reforms on Investment code, we analyzed the restrictive policies for foreign 
ownership of certain economic sectors. In case of Morocco, we found that most of the 
restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors were lifted and foreign firms could have 
equity participation of more than 49 %. However, Morocconization aimed to reduce French 
firms involvement in Moroccan economy had predominantly influenced on the political and 
economic behavior of the elites during the reform period, and Moroccan capital shares 
mostly handed over to Moroccans. It was illustrated in the process of privatization when 
most of the enterprises were sold to Moroccans. 
Though the World Bank dataset on Tunisia’ privatization did not sufficiently provide the 
transaction type but based on findings in documents about privatization, it was revealed that 
Tunisia used the strategy of selling shares on the Tunisian Stock exchange. These findings 
outlined that those deals related to the small investor transactions and many of the listed 
companies in the Bourse could not meet the declared set of standards by Tunis Bourse. The 
analysis of Public enterprises restructuring Loan (PERL) for Tunisia, SAPs I and II for 
Morocco regarding private sector development demonstrated that while the reforms aimed 
to increase the capacities of the private sector, most of the companies depended on the 
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support of public sector subsidies. The small private sector was not adequately addressed in 
reforms and moreover, it had no sufficient resources to participate in privatization. 
Exploring privatized companies from World Bank Privatization dataset and the list of 
companies from the Moroccan corresponding state agency, we outlined the regular 
presence of few well-known Moroccan business groups in the principal operations during 
purchase. These groups purchased profitable companies mainly in banking, insurance, 
telecommunication, as well as mining and agribusiness. By analyzing the Law on 
Privatization in Morocco, we concluded that though the employees had a right to participate 
in privatization allocation of shares it was not considerable which allowed other influential 
stakeholders to acquire the large part of the shares. Predominantly, examining the results of 
reforms in financial sector under FMDL Loan and crosschecking with Privatization dataset 
we found that ten financial institutions, contributed about 30% of total value added of the 
sector, were privatized by financial conglomerates, such as ONA-SNI where Benjelloun, 
Kettani, Akhannouch families have a significant share of assets. 
In combination with data from the national and World Bank Privatization dataset, we found 
that methods of divestiture and specifically golden share and noyau dur used as one of the 
core types of acquiring assets in both countries. The analysis of golden share allows us to 
state that through golden share as a legal method, the elites added control over the 
ownership of the newly privatized companies, as according to the concept of a golden share 
the government is allowed to veto and keep control rights over the company to be 
privatized. Based on Privatization database, noyau dur (or hardcore) of investors used in 
Morocco for privatization we found that direct negotiations were the preferred type of 
divestiture. A hardcore of investors favored this type allowing generating more revenue 
instead through open tender or the stock market. 
Deriving from our findings, we conclude that the organization of privatization process, the 
methods and type of operations of divestiture and the scope of defined restrictions for local 
and foreign participation, outlined the consolidation of economic power of elites and 
ensured an open space for maneuver of cronies to reset their interest and expand the 
network through the whole economy. In parallel, the absence of political liberalization of 
the system did not allow to entirely creating fair market rules and regulations.  
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The process of privatization showed that the greater involvement of the state in economic 
decision making was not diminished, as upper classes neglected the alleged objective of 
neoliberalism and restructured their economic power consolidating their profits and capital 
and re-establishing the conditions in new economic realities. 
The study of neoliberal policies’ influence on the possible evolution of crony capitalism 
under non-democratic regimes showed that the neoliberalism directed to the reduction of 
state involvement in market regulations and creation of less state concept as a means to 
combat cronyism served to the evolution of the cronyism bringing it to a higher level: crony 
capitalism in Morocco and Tunisia. 
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     7.  Conclusion 
 
The goal of this study was to examine whether crony capitalism has been developed in 
Morocco and Tunisia during the implementation of neoliberal reforms. We have started 
with the examination of SAPs within the framework of Washington Consensus Agenda and 
imposed by the IFIs on Morocco and Tunisia for macroeconomic stabilization measures 
and structural reforms and compare the outcomes taking into account also the starting 
points of economic development models for both countries and the chosen approaches for 
the transition. We concluded that while stabilization measures were mostly supported to the 
economic improvement and main market liberalization objectives were met to some extent, 
but, SAPs had been developed within three pillars of liberalization, stabilization, and 
privatization and imposed by World Bank as a universalistic approach without accounting 
the particularities of the countries. Washington Consensus agenda dogmatically promoted 
the prescriptions whereas the governments in Morocco and Tunisia could not find the 
balance between the concept of withdrawal of the state from the market and its capacities 
for the institutional development of the markets.  The state had to adjust to the new 
economic opportunities. 
In our analysis of the relationship between neoliberal policies and crony capitalism, we 
based first of all on examination of roots of cronyism before pre-reform period, and we 
found that deep roots of business-state ties and well-developed network of cronies were an 
inherent part of both countries. By examining the possible evolution of crony capitalism in 
the context of privatization, we concluded that privatization was implemented for the 
benefit of the most favored sectors of the economy. The organization of privatization 
process in a non-transparent way, the preferential treatment of the methods of privatization 
securing advantages position of elite groups, the poor developed private sector as well as 
the dominance of big businesses and proved that the unfair market competition only 
supported to the enlargement of the cronies’ assets across diverse sectors of the economy. 
The analysis of various aspects of neoliberal reforms showed that the old system of cronies 
had not been weakened impacted by new adjustments but on the contrary, the cronies were 
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capable of consolidating themselves in certain areas of economic importance and even re-
engineered the methods to develop crony capitalism. 
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